Technical memo addressing the Energy Policy advising the Minister of Public Enterprise on Policy Adoption

This technical memorandum will begin to review the current policy structures of the Energy Policy adopted but not yet implemented in South Africa. It will structure the context of this analysis from the White Paper on Renewable Energy 2003, the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) developed by the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME, 2004), as well as the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, and the 2021 COP26 United Nations Conference. According to the White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003) South Africa identified that the emissions from coal generated energy, such as carbon dioxide, fossil fuels such as petroleum and coal have placed the country in a spotlight surrounding climate change. The context suggests that South Africa plans to address the crisis in the distribution and production of electricity by various embedded generation processes. This memorandum will review three main projects that directly influence governments decision on the procurement of renewable energy projects namely, the Independent Energy Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPP) of Karpowerships South Africa, the R131 billion commitment from various countries at the  COP26 for South Africa, and the Green Hydrogen procurement programme on behalf of the German development bank, KfW. Forming part of the energy policy task team, the following will be analysed as to advise the Minster of Public Enterprise, Pravin Gordhan, on the adoption of a workable energy policy. A brief situation analysis of the current state of the policy process, the potential stakeholders who may influence the policy, the post-implementation and the associated measures, and lastly, the specific risks associated with the policy process that could lead to policy failure. 

South Africa’s three main embedded generation projects 

Independent Energy Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPP)- Karpowerships South Africa

According to South African Government (n.d) the REIPPPP situated itself in a position to be admired by various other African countries, due to its successful generation capacity of 6 000 MW which were allocated to bidders from a range of technologies, “principally in wind and solar”. The South African government recognised that the REIPPPP provided the country with alternative energy supply to combat the degradation of power supply from Eskom. Moreover, the generation of renewable energy in the Eastern Cape created approximately “18 132 jobs, while the province was awarded 16 wind farms and one solar energy farm with a total investment of R33,7 billion” (South African Government, n.d). Furthermore, it was noted that the allocation of 2 500 MW was allocated for specific coal programme procurements from independent power producers (IPP), while South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) signed an agreement in 2014, the Grand Inga Project which secured 500 MW between both countries. Eberhard, Kolker, and Leigland (2014, p.1) recognised that South Africa’s IPP was a “competitive tender process that was designed to facilitate private sector investment into grid-connected renewable energy (RE) generation in South Africa”. 

During March 2021, South Africa launched its preferred bidders for the Risk Mitigation IPP Procurement Programme (RMIPPPP), which saw the Turkish energy provider, Karpowerships SA, secure three ports for energy ratification. Moreover, the IRP 2019 identified the demand for electricity, while the South African Government (2021) argued that the “rollout of electricity infrastructure envisaged in the IRP is carried out” by the Ministerial Determinations under Section 34 of the Electricity Regulations. Moreover, during President, Cyril Ramaphosa’s, announcement of the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan, the essential need for energy security was identified to assist the country in its economic recovery. South African Government (2021) identified eight preferred bidders for the RMIPPPP, while it noted: “These 8 projects will inject a total private sector investment amount of R45 billion to the South African economy, with an average local content of 50% during the construction period”. 

However, despite the successful procurement of these eight bidders, it was met with controversy, while South African environmental groups argued that the procurement and establishment of Karpowerships in the three ports of Richards Bay, Coega, and Saldanha Bay posed an environmental risk. During June 2021, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) argued that the Competent Authority within the department failed to submit the correct application for the National Management Act and section of the Environmental Impact Assessment regulation. In addition, Carnie (2021) argued that the DMRE extended the deadline regardless of the political interference and allegations of the rejection of Karpowerships environmental impact assessment (EIA). However, regardless of Gwede Mantashe’s, deadline the group, Green Connection highlighted that these power generation projects “were not in the public interest” (Carnie, 2021). In terms of policy this creates a hindrance for the DMRE, as Carnie (2021, p.1) argues that “DMRE’s apparent determination to cling to fossil fuels was key to the ‘Uproot the DMRE’ campaign launched by civil society, calling for a system change”. 

Green Hydrogen from KfW

Creamer (2021) highlighted in an article featured in Engineering News that the German government bank, KfW planned to initiate a programme in South Africa valued at Euro 200 million to support green hydrogen projects. Moreover, Creamer (2021) indicated that the money was in the form of a concessional loan appointed to the Council for Scientific Research (CSIR) and Meridian Economics. According to the context, green hydrogen is “produced using renewable electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen using an electrolyser” (Creamer, 2021). The author states that KfW National Hydrogen Strategy adopted in 2020, factors the role of decarbonisation with the assistance of renewable resources. CSIR principal engineer, Thomas Roos, voiced: “Projects could involve the production, transportation, export and/or storage of green hydrogen and green-hydrogen products, as well as projects in existing materials and chemicals value chains that support a transition from fossil-based processes to ones based on green hydrogen”. This adoption of alternative generation can ensure the ease of alternative electrical supplies, specifically ones that are contributing positively to climate change. However, this external influence of national stakeholders could create risks for South Africa, whereby concessional loans could hinder the countries internal capabilities in the public sector, whereby certain organisations could feel they have power over the loan and the ratification of electricity which could create a divide in public value and the true intent of the project. Additionally, this adoption of a programme could factor in many positives, due to the stakeholders involved. The CSIR as well as Meridian could act as a regulator of the funds and the project itself. 

COP26 United Nations Conference 

During the COP26, South Africa was awarded concessional finance from the European Union, which consists of France, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Moreover, the event followed the global norths agenda, of accelerating South Africa’s dependency on coal into retrospect. Godhino (2021) stated that this consortium offered South Africa a loan of approximately R131 billion to phaseout out the production and use of coal. Consequently, the author suggests that this amount would be split over the country’s dependency on coal, its socio-economic conditions of direct coal related jobs, as while as the grant of $200 million from the Climate Investment Funds. However, the risks associated with this roll-out phase are directly influenced by the amount of jobs that are dependent on coal production, despite the agenda of rapid expansion of renewable energy, South Africa is still largely one of the biggest producers of coal. Its noted that Eskom would need $30 billion over 10 to 15 years to manage its first phase out of coal, including “just transition initiatives, repurposing existing plants, and extending the grid to support renewables” (Godhino, 2021, p,2). Moreover, the concessional loan relies heavily on Eskom’s failing budget sheet, this loan would need to first secure Eskom as an entity, placing the organisation in a stable position. The concessional finance is imperative that its used correctly, while Meridian Economics states that South African treasury would need to secure loans at a reduced intertest rate with the agreement of  a set price. Godhino (2021) indicated that “additional mitigation would result from the accelerated decarbonisation of the power sector,” with an aim of completion by 2040. 

Energy Policy in South Africa

The Department of Energy and Resources (2004) highlights within the White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003) that South Africa is largely dependent on the production of coal and coal resources, this dependency is seen in the number of people who work in coal-related jobs. However, the need to move away from the production of fossil fuels is evident in South Africa’s view and disposition towards climate change and decarbonisation. The White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003) argues that South Africa has recognised that the emissions of greenhouse gas and use of fossil fuel, has created an international intervention. During the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, a deal on sustainable development was decided. Von Schirnding (2005, p,2) highlights that the developmental needs of Africa, has a “strong focus on household energy, water and sanitation”. As it is seen on the dependency of fossil fuels and environmental inclination. 

Energy Policy Situation Analysis 

The White Paper on Renewable Energy is overseen in governments White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (DME, 1998), “which pledges government support for the development, demonstration, and implementation of renewable energy sources for both small and large scale applications” (The Department of Energy and Resources 2004, p. 1). Moreover, the White Paper notes governments commitment, vision, strategies, and objectives to implement and promote renewable energy in South Africa. The White Paper highlights government’s vision in adapting its idea of an ‘energy economy’ while it states: “An energy economy in which modern renewable energy increases its share of energy consumed and provides affordable access to energy throughout South Africa, thus contributing to sustainable development and environmental conservation” (The Department of Energy and Resources 2004, p.1). The advancement of the energy policy is to ensure that government enforces possible renewable sources of energy into its energy portfolio over a certain time period. However, given South Africa’s fiscal resources as well as its economy, limited resources are available for renewable energy programmes which places emphasis on ensuring that the “global climate change resources and other financial resource are accessed to facilitate its implementation” (The Department of Energy and Resources 2004, p.2). Strategically government will systematically need to deploy various programmes, partake in discussions with stakeholders, and access concessional loans that will assist with its journey of adapting a sustainable environment. 

The White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003) highlights South Africa’s dependency on coal and notes that fossil fuels are the country’s primary source of energy, which accounts for 90% of all production with the use of coal (Department of Minerals and Energy, 2004). Additionally, the total amount of electricity which was generated in 1991 culminated around 91% of it deriving from coal (The Department of Energy and Resources 2004, p.4). The White Paper highlights that South Africa’s “reliance on fossil fuels to meet energy requirements” is seen within its economy and trade, while the country accounts for one of the largest exporters of coal. Moreover, the concern from the global north places emphasis on the rate of concern surrounding climate change in the country. 

Potential stakeholders who influence the adoption of a policy 

Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary (2005) argue that policy implementation is no longer dependant on a top-down approach that is highlighted by governments involvement alone, but the active contribution from private, public and non-profit organisations which can influence the idea of governance. Moreover, the authors suggest that citizens participation can be the tool makers behind participation by government. “Practice is leading theory in developing processes for the new governance. As they meet their obligations to execute our public laws, public agencies engage in activities that range from the legislative or quasi-legislative to the judicial or quasi-judicial” (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005, p. 547). Frederickson (1991) identifies five theories of the public for “public administration, the public as interest group (pluralist), consumer (public choice), represented voter (legislative), client, and citizen” (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005, p. 549). As suggested this direct contribution by the public expresses the view, that public opinion can influence the policy-making cycle. 

Considering the energy policy the engagement from public administration as highlighted by Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary (2005) directly explains the volatility and the importance of having a horizontal partnership between stakeholders. The notion of a top-down approach can cause pubic divide and increase scepticism among citizens, when they feel their opinion or influence is disregarded. This deepens the role of citizen interaction with governance, while the implementation stage can yield a greater intertest in something such as climate change as opposed to a smaller more constraint policy such as land reform, which is specific to South Africa alone.

A review of the case of phasing out fossil fuels for the adaption of renewable energy resources in Switzerland will be discussed. The Swiss Federal Council deployed a strategy surrounding the reduced energy consumption of fossil fuels by 54% which explains the need for measurable adaption within a policy. According to Diaz, Adler, and Patt (2017, p.4) the planning of the hydropower project proved to be complex, while the public opposed the strategy. Therefore, as highlighted by the authors, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy attempted to address the hydropower debate in the country, while “this situation highlights the need for a deep analysis of stakeholder perspectives on the matter” (Diaz, Adler, and Patt, 2017, p.4). 

Diaz, Adler, and Patt (2017) question whether a stakeholders’ perceptive on renewable energy can pose a risk to the implementation of the policy itself. Moreover, the authors state: “local stakeholders ate pro-producers, national stakeholders are pro-efficiency” (Diaz, Adler, and Patt, 2017, p,1). As suggested the idea that potential stakeholders can strongly influence the adoption of a sustainable policy framework is directly influenced by the decision that the stakeholders accept the policy itself. Therefore, imperative to the energy policy, the most important stakeholders would be government itself as well as local and national environmental lobbyists. “The human dimension of public acceptance involves perceptions, namely justice in the outcome and the process of engagement, distributive fairness, protected values and place attachment” (Diaz, Adler, and Patt, 2017, p,3). As stated public acceptance of a policy can either negatively or positively impact a policy, while the economic cost-benefits of the policy are determined by the regulatory acceptance of citizens. An environmental lobbyist as a potential stakeholder can persuade public participation, if the campaigning behind the goal of reduced carbon emissions and renewable energy sources are implemented. If Karpowerships SA is used as a benchmark, the idea that incorrect environmental approvals were appealed, while environmentalist’s such as the Green Connection opposed the idea of power ships. This is a clear indication that there was not enough involvement in the REIPPPP by external stakeholders apart from those that directly influence the IPP. Therefore, there is a need for an enhanced communication stage within the policy decision-making cycle that accounts for public administration of a policy objective. 

Process and associated measures that could lead to successful adoption and implementation of the sustainable energy policy framework

Firstly, the succession of a policy process measured by its implementation can be defined by the policy itself. The context suggests that the goals and objectives are to move away from alternative energy supplies such as fossil fuel and develop a framework around sustainable development. The Department of Energy and Resources (2004) highlights in the White Paper on Renewable Energy 2003 that sustainable development is counteracted by the “integration of social, economic, and environmental factors” that are continuously monitored throughout the planning, implementing and decision-making cycle. 

Birkland (1998) argued that if an event could potentially cause more harm than good in the future that it would be considered as a focusing event. Therefore, if the process of focusing media attention and public participation around a certain policy could strategically measure its adoption, would the idea of centring focus around alternative energy production and distribution not create public influence? The context suggested that Eskom was being sabotaged, if the use of focusing events can be implemented on a wider scale, whereby public opinion is monitored on the implementation of a policy this could therefore, influence the adoption of the policy framework. In addition, the conditions that need to be satisfied before the policy reaches the adoption phase would need to consider the concept of the policy, the consideration of all stakeholders input, and the means of measuring the design itself. Therefore, you would want the policy to be run cohesively through society, feasibility studies, and surveys before it can be sustainably accommodated by government and regulators. The idea that a policy is adopted by government and not yet implemented, will rely on its measurability scale. Once all the processes have been correctly adapted only then can the policy be measured and adopted. 

Risks in the policy process

The result of risk to a policy which could lead to the failure of the policy before it was ever implemented can rely on the envisaged objectives at the start. May (2015) argues that the failure of policies is hallmarked by the policy design itself. May (2015) highlights the failure of the American Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – Obamacare, where the complexities of the health care reform were intertwined with political policy reform and state health website glitches. Risks which could potentially affect the policy process are reliant on the features that the policy begun with. If conflict is not resolute from the get go, conflict among stakeholders and government actors can be clouded by patriarchal views. May (2015) explains that the two main problems why policy fails is owned to the initial implementation of the policy, and the shortfalls from strengthen the implementation prospects. 

For the energy policy to progressively be successful the following risks need to be avoided. Gatzert and Kosub (2017) identify that risk management and risk assessment are vital in understanding the risks that drive a policy. Moreover, the risks associated with the energy policy can be dependent on not enough global input in aligning the policy when its adopted. The influence of stakeholders that could potentially influence the policy itself, and simply corruption and greed. If programmes such as the one implemented by KfW are not carefully regulated, the amount of money injected in the country could fall into the wrong hands, leading to policy failure. Additionally, political influence over public participation can pose as a risk, whilst some policies have a great cycle but fail to ever be implemented. This could pose as one of the greatest risks. 

Conclusion 

The energy generation landscape and energy climate of South Africa is continuously evolving, moving away from the production of fossil fuels to renewable energy supplies. This has carefully been analysed from the KfW programme, to Karpowerships, to the loan from the COP26 in Glasgow. The REIPPPP can potentially be a great IPP, if careful consideration is paid to the stakeholders involved. As noted the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan carefully places South Africa’s views on climate change at the forefront, the careful planning and adoption of a policy can move from the adoption phase to the implementation phase if all considerations are applied.

References

Bingham, L. B., Nabatchi, T., & O’Leary, R. (2004). The new governance: practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government. Public administration review, 65(5), 547-558. https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/432/files/58064/download?wrap=1

Birkland, T. A. (1998). Focusing Events, Mobilization, And Agenda Setting. Journal of Public Policy, 18(1), 53-74. https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/432/pages/unit-4-lecture-materials-agenda-setting-and-policy-cycles?module_item_id=12803

Carnie, T. (2021, October 1). ‘Smelly’ midnight lifeline: Karpowership gets another extension for emergency power deal. Daily Maverick. Retrieved December 9, 2021 from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-01-smelly-midnight-lifeline-karpowership-gets-another-extension-for-emergency-power-deal/

Creamer, T. (2021, June 2). Germany’s KfW Launches Green Hydrogen Programme for South Africa. Engineering News. Retrieved December 5, 2021 from https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/germanys-kfw-launches-green-hydrogen-programme-for-south-africa-2021-06-02

Department of Minerals and Energy. (2004). White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa. Government Gazette, 446. Retrieved from https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/261691.pdf

Diaz, P., Adler, C., & Patt, A. (2017). Do stakeholders’ perspectives on renewable energy infrastructure pose a risk to energy policy implementation? A case of a hydropower plant in Switzerland. Energy Policy, 108, 21-28. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.033

Eberhard, A., Kolker, J., & Leigland, J. (2014). South Africa’s Renewable Energy IPP Procurement Program: Success Factors and Lessons. World Bank Group. https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/south-africa-s-renewable-energy-ipp-procurement-program-success-factors-and-lessons-0

Gatzert, N. & Kosub, T. (2017). Determines Of Policy Risks of Renewable Energy Investments. International Journal of Energy Sector Management, 11(1), 28-45. DOI:10.1108/IJESM-11-2015-0001

Godhino, C. (2021, November 9). Climate finance for South Africa at COP26: Watch this space. Energy for Growth Hub. Retrieved December 6, 2021 from https://www.energyforgrowth.org/memo/climate-finance-for-south-africa-at-cop26-watch-this-space/

May, P.J. (2015). Implementation failures revisited: Policy regime perspectives. Public Policy and Administration, 30(3-4), 277-299. https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/432/files/58108/download?wrap=1

South African Government. (2021, March 18). Minister Gwede Mantashe: Media briefing announcing preferred bidders for Risk Mitigation IPP Procurement Programme. Retrieved December 5, 2021 from https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-gwede-mantashe-media-briefing-announcing-preferred-bidders-risk-mitigation-ipp

South African Government. (n.d). Renewable Independent Power Producer Programme. Retrieved December 9, 2021 from https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/renewable-independent-power-producer-programme

Von Schirnding, Y. (2005). The World Summit on Sustainable development: reaffirming the centrality of health. Globalization and Health (8). https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-1-8

A contextual review of the relationship between SASSA and SAPO with an applied hypotheses of a best-fit approach towards organised change

This post will provide a contextual review of SAPO, with a case study on the relationship between SAPO and SASSA, and how each public entity attempted to integrate an approach to change management in improving the current organisational, structural, and strategic objectives. Moreover, the current model of the organisation’s innovation will be reviewed. According to Todnem (2005, p.369) “change management has been defined as the process of continually renewing an organization’s direction, structural, and capabilities to serve the ever-changing needs of external and internal customers”. The literature provides clarity on the main argument of this paper, however, change management within the public sector lacks “empirical evidence and supported by unchallenged hypotheses” (Todnem, 2005, p.396). Therefore, it will be argued whether the relationship between SASSA and SAPO was to improve on existing capabilities within SAPO, or adapting a planned approach to change management. The best-fit approach to change management will also be analysed with an understanding that the organisation aligned its HR strategies with a wider overview of the organisational environment. 

Change management 

Todnem (2005, p.37) argues that “since the need for change is unpredictable, it tends to be reactive, discontinuous, ad-hoc, and often triggered by a situation of organisational crisis”. The author suggests that organisations could follow a series or pattern of change due to its environmental capabilities. In private sector organisations, change is inevitable and at times needed due to the competitive environment. However, change management in public sector organisations could be initiated via a top-down approach of management or it could follow the notion of New Public Management (NPM). 

“Organisations are grappling with the changes in market conditions, workforce demographics and diversity, technological innovations, increased focus on customer and quality, shortage of talent and economical changes” (Maheshwari & Vohra, 2015, p.872). According to the theory of change management there are three prevalent approaches namely, developmental change that focuses on the “change that improves existing skill, method or performance standards” (Mabetwa, 2002, p.8). Additionally there is transitional change that is centred around the “replacement of the old with the new” Todnem (2005, p.370) over a set period of time, and lastly, transformational change that “brings about a radical shift from one state of being to another” (Mabetwa, 2002, p.10). It is therefore evident that organisational change emerges from the approach that is applied dependent on the need for change management.

Contextual review of SAPO

According to an overview on National Government (n.d) website, The South African National Post Office (SAPO) is recognised as a state-owned enterprise that is mandated to provide a service to improving public value on the basis of service delivery. The objectives of SAPO are focused on improving access to services such as “courier and freight, financial services, electronic bill payments, and a variety of government services such as Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP)” (National Government, n.d). However, in 2017 the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) integrated itself with the National Payment System within SAPO’s financial division in transforming the social grant payment structure. Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2017) states that the relationship between both entities was to ensure that the ability to reach rural areas was achieved through the initiative of partnering SASSA’s offerings with SAPO’s services. 

Therefore, did government implement this initiative between both public entities to ensure that SASSA capacitates the payment system from SAPO over time? Saba (2017) argues that the agreement between government and both subsidiaries ensured that SASSA “will take over the payment system, whilst both parties have agreed to implement the necessary recruitment and training of human resources”. Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2017) reviewed the initial meeting summary that explained the engagement between both entities, whilst members had concluded by questioning the strategic objectives, “R1,1 billion profit made by Cash Master Paymaster Service (CPS), termination of current work streams, and illegal deductions”. Maheshwari & Vohra (2015, p.872) state that “HR practise during the process of change management in organisations becomes scarce, presenting a more generic view stating that HR should provide leadership and develop necessary capabilities within the organisation during this process”. Additionally, the question should be posed: If HR and management play such a significant role in organisational change, why is then that organisational capabilities, financial structures, and organisational culture of SAPO almost collapsed at the hands of poor management from SASSA. 

According to Felix (2020) 72 people were arrested in SASSA due to the agency defrauding over R50 million in just one year, whilst it spent R18 million on efforts of recovering this money. Moreover, Nemakonde (2021) explained that SAPO had allegedly closed more than 130 branches nationwide due to internal financial capabilities. Therefore, would this initiative between both subsidiaries blame it on the systems of poor change management or poor management from a top-down approach? The practise behind change management would be understood to have followed a planned approach from the context, however, due to the issues that arose, could both entities implement an incremental change? Incremental change as understood by Todnem (2005, p.396) is “individual parts of an organisation deal with one problem and one objective separately”. Therefore, could SASSA and SAPO amend the relationship through a new set of objectives to concentrate once again on public value.

SARS and Siyakha

A case study presented by Mabetwa (2002) studied change management with emphasis on the South African Revenue services (SARS). The author analysed whether SARS could accurately implement an approach of change management through an initiative called Siyakha. Whilst the author applied qualitative and quantitative methods as well as the four step approach to change management, namely: exploration, planning, action, and integration (Todnem, 2005, p.373). The author concluded that to ensure that the public sector meets the demands of public value, it would need to operate along a paradigm of business principles. 

Moreover, the author states that organisations can overcome the challenges of change management “if the entity is able to manage change effectively” (Mabetwa, 2000, p.70). 

Figure 1.1

Source: Beyond Change Management, Linda Ackerman Anderson (1986) Retrieved from https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/4988/Mabetwa_Nathaniel_2002.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

According to Figure 1.1, Mabetwa (2002, p.13) concedes that change management can be achieved in a public sector provided the organisation learns and empowers employees at all levels of change. 

Conclusion 

Organisational culture needs to effectively be understood by the whole organisation if change management can effectively be implemented. Todnem (2005, p.378) concedes that “successful management of change is a highly required skill”. Although SAPO and SASSA are both dealing with internal organisational capabilities, the best-fit approach would be to adapt a framework that manages organisational change from top down management to the organisations as a whole. Moreover, the nature of both organisations needs to be carefully re-analysed so that any form of an existing initiative can be re-integrated as to ensure that both entities abide by the rules of successful change management. 

References 

Felix, J. (2020, October 19). 72 people arrested as SASSA card related fraud soars. News24. Retrieved July 4, 2021 from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/72-people-arrested-as-sassa-card-related-fraud-soars-20201019

Mabetwa, N. (2002). Change Management In A Public Sector Organisation: A Case Stud Of The South African Revenue Services (SARS). Retrieved July 4, 2021 from https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/4988/Mabetwa_Nathaniel_2002.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Maheshwari, S., & Vohra, V. (2015). Identifying critical HR practices impacting employee perception and commitment during organizational change. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 28(5), 872-894. http://doi.org.innopac.wits.ac.za/10.1108/JOCM-03-2014-0066

National Government. (n.d). South African Post Office (SAPO). Retrieved July 4, 2021from https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/177/south-african-post-office-sapo

Nemakonde, V. (2021, May 27). SA Post Office to close 130 branches nationwide amid cash crunch. The Citizen. Retrieved July 4, 2021 from https://citizen.co.za/news/2503448/sa-post-office-to-close-130-branches-nationwide-amid-cash-crunch/

Saba, A. (2017, December 12). The SASSA-SAPO grants deal: All the details revealed. Mail & Guardian. Retrieved July 4, 2021 from https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-12-the-nuts-and-bolts-of-the-sassa-and-sapo-contract/

Todnem, R. (2005). Organisational change management: A critical review. Journal of Change Management, 5(4), 369-380. https://doi.org/10.1080/14697010500359250

Critical Debates in Evaluation

This post will offer a well-reasoned and substantiated nuance with reference to the Stewart, Dayal, Langer, and van Rooyen (2019) reading which argued that evidence-based policy and implementation, or evidence-informed decision-making was in line with the most recent thinking, often categorized from two inter-related but limited perspectives. Stewart et al. (2019) states that the two inter-related perspectives stemmed firstly from an approach that originated from developed Northern countries, and secondly, it was conceptualized as a technical intervention. Firstly, this paper will critically assess the two perspectives on evidence-based policy and decision making. Secondly, it will derive and comment on current evaluation thinking found in Southern Africa as well as globally. Moreover, 2-3 “critical success factors” will be highlighted in providing well-reasoned and substantiated improvement and development impacts of evaluation practice in South Africa’s public sector. 

Evaluation in Various Evidence Ecosystems 

According to Stewart et al. (2019), the evidence-based approach to policymaking and implementation is centered around the notion of better decisions as well as a better future. “It is focused on the effective use of scarce resources, on avoiding harm and maximizing good” (Stewart et al., 2019, p.2). It was argued that these principles are grounded and embedded in equity and equality, of accountability and transparency (Stewart et al., 2019). The concept of an evidence-based approach found in evaluation can be counterintuitive to what the ecosystem of an intervention consists of. Consideration is often noted to be a contributing factor to how an intervention is being used, as well as the evaluation framework. “Exploring the use of evidence in terms of the whole, rather than just parts thereof, is an attractive proposition, and assists in moving away from the limitation of the technical intervention lens” (Stewart et al., 2019, p.2). As noted, the term evidence-ecosystem as stated by Stewart et al. (2019) can provide the link between both the internal and external factors of an intervention. Moreover, the term often used in a South African climate can be defined by Stewart et al. (2019, p.2) as: “A system reflecting the formal and informal linkages and interactions between different actors (and their capacities and resources) involved in the production, translation, and use of evidence”. 

Evidence-based policy and decision making 

Marmot (2004) argued the notion of whether the term should be deemed evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence. Marmot (2004) stated that given government intervention, the topic of inequalities found in health in Britain in the 1980s, was not broad enough to expect government to act on the issue. Marmot (2004) clarified that given this context government is urged to act more on a model of evidence-based policy than what scientists suggest on a certain intervention. “Scientific evidence on dose response relations between exposure and risk is only one consideration. Others include analysis of costs and benefits, risk analysis, and appreciation of the degree to which policies fit with public values” (Marmot, 2004, p.1). 

Figure 1: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/21/9197

According to Figure 1, given the example of lung cancer implicit to radioactive gas naturally occurring n Ireland, 300 cases of lung cancer were reported annually. This equates to 12% of all lung cancer deaths founded in the region (Lacchia, Schuitem, and Banerjee, 2020). According to Lacchia et al. (2020) despite health related risks in Ireland, a certain health policy which is well-defined is not found, which inherently shifts the focus towards an “indoor radon policy development in Ireland” (Lacchia et al., 2020, p.1). Lacchia et al. (2020) stated that with the use of an evidence-based policy making process which uses political, scientific, and practical knowledge, a different dimension towards an intervention can be thought out. Additional reference is given to the organisations as well as the role of stakeholders, which balances the crucialness of the health policy. “Figuratively, this would mean that evidence-based policymaking should exist where political knowledge, practical knowledge, and scientific knowledge intersect with each other,” as argued by Lacchia et al. (2020, p.1) highlighted in Figure 1. 

Moreover, Stewart et al. (2019) stated that the ecosystem of evaluation rely on the structural foundation for evidence-informed decision making. Stewart et al. (2019) highlighted that despite governments role in acting on a specific intervention, the space for third party stakeholder intervention (organisational/ organism) should not be ruled out in identifying policy given evidence-based decisions. “Viewed as a whole, South Africa’s evidence ecosystem features a divers and established number of organisations driving both demand for and supply and evidence” (Stewart et al., 2019, p.5). In addition, it was noted that the significance of the system would not be fragmented through the notion of supply and demand, but rather connected through the partnerships among individuals and organisations which impede the complexity of the evidence-based ecosystem of evaluations. Marais and Matebesi (2013) suggest that evidence-based policy making has become entrenched in the development of Provincial Growth and Development Strategies founded in South Africa, while the concept of evidence-based policy has not yet been well developed at a provincial level. Moreover, the policy approach towards policy development in South Africa post-apartheid has been influenced liberally as the “antithesis off the apartheid policies on race whole more centralist policy initiatives have also been raised” (Marais & Matebesi, 2013, p.3). 

Therefore, according to Stewart et al. (2019) and Marais and Matebesi (2013), policy intervention is closely related to the modernisation agenda of principles that provide policy makers with improved knowledge surrounding social discourse. “Social science, according to this discourse, should not only provide reflection on policy but also provide evidence on which policy can be developed” (Marais and Matebesi, 2013, p.4). Moreover, as suggested the relationship between both research and policy development should be contested by the results of influence in rational knowledge, which provides a constructivist world view on social and cultural constructs (Stewart et al., 2019).  

Resilience and complexity of decision-making in South Africa 

Stewart et al. (2019) stated that South Africa’s evidence ecosystem reflected resilience. “There is an inter-relationship between complexity in an environmental ecosystem and resilience” (Stewart et al., 2019, p.3). Furthermore, Stewart et al. (2019) discussed the resilience and complexities in South Africa’s evidence ecosystem, in which four main ideas were emphasised to analyse the domains of complexity. It was noted that role players and individuals involvement in intervention was noted to be the most complex due to the increasing inter-connectedness of individuals and organisations. “The departments engagement with evidence for decision-akin has some depth and some breadth, largely responding to an accountability agenda,” as argued by Stewart et al. (2019, p 8). As ssuggested the ideas of evidence-based policy making is trickled down through the various individuals and organisations which provide intervention, while role players founded among these two groups provide executive decisions based off of initiatives supported by research councils, universities and government departments on all levels. 

South Africa’s current evaluation thinking as well as globally 

According to Stewart et al. (2019) the growth of evidence ecosystem are not unique to South Africa, the need or intervention among social issues presented in countries such as Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Kenya have also increased the approach to intervention based within an evidence-policy framework. Moreover, Stewart et al. (2019) argued that South Africa is not a recipient of an evidence-based approach driven from the North, but rather lessons can be drawn out for the evidence community be it in the North or South. “Overall, we have observed how many of the moral arguments for evidence-informed decision-making (EIDM) are reinforced by the social and political contexts in South Africa, and we propose this is true for the global South as a whole,” as argued by Stewart et al. (2019, p. 10). Moreover, this notion towards EIDM by the South can be implicit to the nature of wasted resources on interventions which could be proved to be fruitless. The potential of EIDM in poorer communities can provide transparency and trust between organisations and individual, which according to Stewart et al. (2019) has proven to be more successful in South Africa as compared to developed countries. In addition, Stewart et al. (2019, p.10) founded that “Our hypothesis is that where the public sector is a key tool for development, such as in the case of South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP), countries are more willing to share experiences and collaborate in building structures for effective public services”. 

“Last but not the least, our exploration of the South African evidence ecosystem has confirmed our position that evidence production, and its use in decision-making is not a uniquely Northern endeavour: it neither needs to be ‘translated’ for the South, nor ‘decolonised’ in that translation” (Stewart et al., 2019, p.10). As suggested the need for innovation and leadership in the South lacks, due to the nature of Western influence within the South. This could pose the notion that a considerable shift is needed in terms of the central mindset, where a balance needs to be found among EIDM in Africa. This can be highlighted through the three different tiers of government, where the implementation of policies could be crucial on a provincial level in improving public value as well as people’s lives. Given the nature of intervention policies in South Africa, the observation between relationship-building as argued by Stewart et al. (2019), can prove to be beneficial in matching an approach to co-production. “If you can build trust within the evidence ecosystem, you are increasing the potential to make a real difference through greater understanding (of policy, of evidence, and of how evidence can enable better policies and their implementation) and through reducing silos and increasing collaboration”, as concluded by Stewart et al. (2019, p.11). 

Langer, Motha, and Fichardt (2016) explained the growth of EIDM in South Africa, while arguing that researchers and research institutions are becoming tailored in their research findings towards decision-making at a policy and practice level. Moreover, the Africa Evidence Network and PAN Children, are two networks which highlight a joint efforts in illustrating the EIDM community. Langer et al. (2016) state that in South Africa the emergence of policy-makers on all levels of government have increasingly begun to notice the value of research within the decision-making process. Its noted that this foundation of collaboration among individuals and organisations as well as the interaction between research and intervention has ensured that initiatives have become coordinated within government’s demand and use of evaluations, namely the Department of Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation. 

EIDM Globally

On a global scale, EIDM can be seen through the intervention of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, mandated by the United Nations, which addresses the need for policy intervention towards social issues. According to the United Nations the SDGs were goals in eradicating all forms of poverty by 2030. On a global scale, it is much easier to identify the exact individuals and organisations employed in the careful collaboration of this agenda. Moreover, it is noted by the United Nations that SDGs are not legally binding, however, governments are expected to establish national frameworks for the achievement of the 17 goals. These various SDGs can be seen through various smaller interventions among countries struggling with social issues. Stewart et al. (2019) states that although South Africa is confronted with global challenges, there is no form of competition among the North, in impeding social change. However, strong relationships are key in mounting change, specifically within the EIDM framework of a province. 

Critical success factors 

Watkins (2012) states that during the 1980s development of the 26 members states which constitute the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), human resource management reforms at a national and local government level in South Africa have supported the management of performance in the public sector. Organisational capabilities as well as organisational culture can be carefully defined in public sector success, however, as Watkins (2012) states, the nature of evaluation in the impact of development can be deliberately improved by the strong relationships between the publics sector and individuals.

Figure 2: https://www.stratrix.com/critical-success-factors/

Liu (2017) states that given the broad utilization of technology as well as organisational changes, information-orientated organisations are generally led by experts, while government formulated policies towards knowledge management can be seen in the strategic planning phase. Two critical success factor which can improve the impact of development within evaluation are: 

• Reinforcement of interventions and long-term evaluation systems 

Various interventions found in South Africa lack implementation as well as longevity. Liu (2017) states that it is vital to consider alternative reinforcement in the implementation of interventions, among several organisations and individuals. A key success factor which could improve the impact of development in the public sector could be focussed on the reinforcement of an intervention. If an intervention policy which facilitates growth and learning in early childhood development (ECD) stages is only collaborated for a certain period, the failure of the usefulness of the interventions can be questioned. In avoiding this, government can deploy a theory-based intervention which monitor’s the issue at hand, while ensuring that long-term the intervention is successfully being used for future ECD stages. E.g. If language learning among children under the age of five is categorised as a social issue among children in areas where English is not a home language, a certain intervention to improve this can be routinely employed each year, while evaluation of how many children benefited from the programme can add to the success of the intervention. As suggested individuals are the indicator for ensuring the success of an intervention centred around social challenges (Liu, 2017). 

• Producing quality interventions 

Stewart et al. (2019) highlight that the success of public and private sector interventions rely on the quality of the intervention itself. If certain social challenges such as gender-based violence (GBV) receive significant collaboration from both individuals and organisation, the need for one or two solid interventions can be proposed, with the mindset that the failure of or lack of evaluation of this intervention should not be imminent. Stewart et al. (2019) states that “these commitments to evidence-informed decision-making have become more explicit over time. In each of these there are individuals, projects, and in some cases formal functions centred around the use of evidence for better decision-making”. Therefore, deepening the evidence system at asocial level would ensure the collaboration and quality from external organisations.  

Conclusion 

The strength and resilience found in south Africa’s evidence ecosystem is perpetually formed through the collaboration of individuals and organisations. Given Stewart et al. (2019) findings, it can be noted that South Africa is resilient among its necessity of social intervention, despite the influence of historical challenges post-apartheid. The careful collaboration between organisation and individual lends itself to the complexity of South Africa’s evaluation system, with the inter-connectedness between both. Moreover, the agenda set by South Africa demonstrates the strong foundation structures within EIDM, which can be seen in the National Development Plan. 

References 

 

Lacchia, A. R., Schuitema, G., & Banerjee, A. (2020). “Following the Science”: In Search of Evidence-Based Policy for Indoor Air Pollution from Radon in Ireland. Sustainability, 12(21), 9197. MDPI AG. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12219197

Liu, H. C. (2017). Critical Success Factors In Public Sectors Practising Knowledge Outsourcing. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 8(4), 159-165. Retrieved from https://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_8_No_4_April_2017/17.pdf

Marais, L., and Matebesi, S. (2013). Evidence-Based Policy Development in South Africa: The Case of Provincial Growth and Development Strategies. Urban Forum, 24, 357-371. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12132-012-9179-4

Marmot. M. G. (2004). Evidence based policy or policy based evidence?. BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 328(7445), 906–907. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.328.7445.906

Stewart, R., Dayal, H., Langer, L., and Van Rooyen, C. (2019). The evidence ecosystem in South Africa: growing resilience and institutionalisation of evidence use. Palgrave Communications, 5(1), 1-12. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0303-0

Public Sector Evaluation Systems

This post will begin reviewing the underlying ecosystems within the National Development Plans (NDPs) Chapter Three: Economy and Employment. The argument of this paper will be anchored in this chapter, while using the National Evaluation Policy Framework’s (NEPF’s) conceptual framework for evaluations (Chapter 2), in developing and presenting an appropriate evaluation process for assessing progress towards achieving one of the development objectives in Chapter 3: Economy and Employment. Moreover, this paper will not provide an evaluation, but will propose an evaluation approach best suited to determine progress in achieving the chosen NDP objective. In addition, a case study of the current ecosystem of the N2 Wild Coast Toll Project (N2WCTR), located in the Eastern Cape, will be analysed in understanding how the projects objectives of economic development as well as job creation, was shadowed by cultural disputes in the Amadiba area. 

N2 Wild Coast Toll Road Project (N2WCTR) 

The South African National Roads Agency (SANRAL) was commissioned by national government with a set budget of approximately R3 billion, in developing a project which would benefit local small, medium, and micro-enterprises (SMMEs), in Mpondoland, in the Eastern Cape. It was noted by SANRAL that this project would form part of the N2 Wild Coast Road, which was accredited to create 8 000 direct jobs, and 20 000 indirect jobs. SANRAL N2 Wild Coast Toll Road project manager, Mbulelo Sonqishe, explained that an additional R38,5 million would be paid in wages to 300 community members which would be directly involved in the project. However, disputes between SANRAL and the Amadiba Crisis Committee (ACC) found that resistance to the project was embedded in the Xolobeni sand mine, namely the uMgungundlovu, which consisted of members from the Amadiba coastal region. The issue set forward by the ACC noted that the road which was planned by SANRAL would directly cut through uMgungundlovu, which would create a biodiversity issue as well as customary laws which would affect the people of the area whose ancestry roots were embedded. 

SANRAL explained that the project was issued an Evaluation & Monitoring Committee to oversee that a biodiversity programme would offset the issue of limited area for grazing, as well as uproot community members of the region. The organisation noted that the programme would create 15 000 hectares of new protected area (Steyn, November 3, 2021), which the ACC highlighted contravened with the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA), which SANRAL said it followed. However, the ACC said despite formal negotiations with SANRAL during September 2021, no formal community access agreement was signed by SANRAL, which inadvertently caused issues with an environmental impact assessment of the area, which SANRAL said it conducted between 2008 to 2009. The ACC concluded that given SANRAL’s statement explaining that no organisation or government official could rightfully block a route approved through a legal process, the ACC required an environmental authorization from the Department of Environmental Affairs. Additional context from the project was argued by Steyn and Damba-Hendrick (2 August 2021) who highlighted that SANRAL’s N2 Wild Coast Toll Road project manager, Craig McLachlan, said community members would be unaffected by the move and that SMMEs could earn R4 billon from the project, as well as the construction of it. 

The underlying issue with this project implemented by SANRAL lacked the consensus of cultural evaluation, given the definition of M&E, as well as the relationship between the values which would cause the results to become implicit in nature. The ecosystem of the programme which included SANRAL, government, non-profit organisations (NGOs), community members, and the beneficiaries need to decide on a value resolution for the overall nature of the programme. Creating public value as underpinned by the NDP 2030, should be efficiently achieved while ensuring that economic stability and job creation dependently influence beneficiaries, while avoiding issues of cultural constraint. 

NDPs, Chapter 3: Economy and Employment 

“According to the NDP 2030, Chapter 3: Economy and Employment, the main objective is centred around the alleviation of poverty and reducing the levels of inequality in South Africa. It was noted that this would be achieved through productivity and growth, while key elements ranged from export, skills development, cost of living, investment in infrastructure, and the improvement of labour markets, among others. The chapter discusses the gross domestic profit’s (GDP’s) direct involvement in economic growth, while highlighting how South Africa is in a “low growth, middle income trap” (NDP 2030, n.d., p. 110)” (Nortman, 2022). 

The NDP’s main premise for the programme is embedded in economic stability and job creation, while promoting exports which the labour economy would absorb. Internal capabilities of Chapter 3 of the NDP 2030, would be focused on results that were immediate which in turn create public value. “The NDP 2030 explains that given South Africa’s misfortune, the country included natural endowments as well as a strong fiscal position allows a strong and deep financial services sector, quality universities, and a small but sophisticated services industry” (NDP 2030, n.d., p. 111)” (Nortman, 2022). 

Evaluation approach best suited to achieving the NDP objective 

According to the NEPF’s Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework of Evaluations, the main aim of the section is to provide context divided into seven subsections. 

Defining Evaluations

According to the context, defining evaluation is a “branch of applied research that attempts to identify cause-effect relationships within a specific intervention context” (NEPF, November 2019). The basis of this subsection is identifying whether the programme implemented is effective, efficient, and cost effective, and how certain intervention could improve the subsequent phases. 

The NDP’s 2030 objective of creating economic stability as well as job creation from exports, contributes to its key points of eliminating poverty and reducing inequality while raising levels employment through productivity, growth, and the earnings of the working people (NDP 2030, n.d., p. 109). Rogers (2008) argues that logical models used in programme theory evaluation represent a reality of a tix-box approach, which realistically is complex in nature. Defining the first approach as addressed in the NEPF it is therefore, essential to understand which approaches the NDP has taken in ensuring the objectives set forward are effective, efficient and cost effective. 

A theme set forward in the Monitoring & Evaluation Indaba held in November 2017, under the theme ‘Opportunities And Challenges Of Using Evidence From Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) To Accelerate Economic Development And Employment In Africa’, challenged the notion of M&E in economic development in South Africa. The former Minister in the Presidency, Jeff Radebe, noted that M&E continued to improve the lives of African countries, which he noted that it contributed to the progress brought forward of how the ideals of human rights, freedom, peace, and development improved the quality of life (Department of Province Economic Development, n.d.). Additional reference during the Indaba explained by the Minister, highlighted how the 5-year Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) was an instrument used by Cabinet in engaging with monitoring evidence. An example of this from of monitoring was seen in Operation Phakisa, which saw stakeholders, private sector members, civil society, and public entities engage with the initiative, Operation Phakisa Delivery Labs. 

Evaluation and Private sector involvement 

NEPF’s Types of Evaluation: Design Evaluation  

Additionally, the (NDP 2030, n.d., p. 109) stated: “South Africa requires both a capable and developmental states, able to act to redress historical inequities and a vibrant and thriving private sector able to invest, employ people, and penetrate global markets”. The NEPF explained that design evaluation would make use of internal logic and consistency of the programme, either before a programme starts, or during the implementation to review whether the theory of change appeared to be relevant and working. “This is quick to do and uses only secondary information and should be used for all new programs, it also assesses the quality of the indicators and the assumptions underpinning the theory of change” (National Evaluation Policy Framework, 2019, p. 24). Greene (2012, p. x) stated that achieving greater social equity is “increasingly becoming a common goal of government, civil society organisations, and development partners alike”. This cooperation between organisations, private sector, and government can actively shape the ecosystem of a programme cohesively. 

The decision brought forward in the NDP in developing capabilities with the intent of private sector development, can be addressed by zoning into the design of the programme. According to South African Government (n.d.), Operation Phakisa was “designed to fast-track the implementation of solutions on critical development issues”. This was decided to address the issues outlined in the NDP 2030 surrounding unemployment and poverty. The Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment (DFFE), highlighted that the introduction of Operation Phakisa: Oceans Economy saw various commitment by both government and private sector involvement in the funding of various projects which would create direct jobs as well as production turnover. 

NEPF’s Types of Evaluation: Outcome Evaluation 

The NEPF highlights within the Outcome Evaluation that: “This form of evaluation should measure the degree to which the program is having effect on the target populations while being and or behaviors” (National Evaluation Policy Framework, 2019, p. 23). This can be monitored through the NDP’s classification of a “middle income trap”. The NDP 2030 (n.d., p.112) states “many economies that have achieved middle income states are struggled to shift further upwards. However, many have experienced substantial, relatively slow growth over the past decade”. This difference would be seen in how much government invests directly into human capital, product development, and technology. If the subsector of the NEPF can be adapted, this form of outcome evaluation can determine whether the intended benefits of a programme are actively achieved. The economic pitfalls of unemployment need to be monitored with emphasis on its outcomes, with more immediate decision-making and intended change. 

NEPF’s Types of Evaluation: Economic Evaluation 

Clair (2016) argued that eyes on a private sector interface could provide engagement and development on M&E standards for adaption. The key drivers which act as important mitigators in M&E can enhance the adaption action by the private sector, which advertently contribute to an enabling environment. This can be highlighted in the NEPF’s subsector of types of economic evaluation. The NEPF stated that an economic evaluation can be implemented at any time of a programme. “Economic evaluation considers whether the costs of a policy or programme are commensurate with the benefits (value add)” (National Evaluation Policy Framework, 2019, p. 23). The NDPs objective of adapting “effective partnerships across society can create a virtuous cycle of rising confidence, rising investment, higher employment, rising productivity and incomes can be generated” (NDP 2030, n.d., p. 109). An evaluation approach towards the objectives outlined could be a continuation of the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), an example could be the emphasis placed by SANRAL on the implementation of a R3 billion project, which adds to job creation. The understanding within the NDPs chapter of economy and employment could be essential in the initial steps input (R3 billion by government), outcomes (jobs created, or the cost of one individual’s employment to the project). The necessity in this step is continuously evaluating the economic derivates of a programme, how much input is needed to effectively create value. 

Conclusion 

The term value in evaluation can be implicit in nature, when held up against the relevant stakeholders which add to the effectiveness of a programme. The NDP’s Chapter 3 on Economy and Employment, can see development pathways of a certain initiative as having embedded views from the ecosystem of the programme. Operation Phakisa is a key initiative employed by government with careful interaction from the private sector. The systemic belief systems of evaluation are mandatory in understanding the values of a programme, while cultural influence can sometimes cause the evaluation of a programme to become linear, if institutional arrangements and individual worldviews are neglected. Classifying which public sector evaluation approaches can be “fit for purpose” will rely on the sub sectors of evaluation, with emphasis on its immediate or long-term outcomes.  

References 

Burger, S. (2021, December 10). Sanral sets aside R3bn to benefit local SMMEs during N2 Wild Coast Road construction. Retrieved 1 June 2022, from https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sanral-sets-aside-r3bn-to-benefit-local-smmes-during-n2-wild-coast-road-construction-2021-12-10  

Clair. A, L. (2016). The private sector perspective on M&E and standards for adaption. The United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change. Retrieved 2 June 2022, from https://unfccc.int/files/focus/adaptation/technical_expert_meeting/application/pdf/20160525_stclair_dnvgl.pdf

Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment. (n.d.). Operation Phakisa – Oceans Economy.Retrieved 2 June 2022, from https://www.dffe.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/operationphakisa/oceanseconomy

Department of Province Economic Development. (n.d.). The 1^st Africa, Monitoring & Evaluation Indaba. Retrieved 2 June, 2022 from https://www.dpme.gov.za/keyfocusareas/gwmeSite/GovermentWide%20M%20and%20E/First%20Africa%20M&E%20Indaba%20Report%20FINAL.PDF

Department Planning, Monitoring, And Evaluation. (2019, November 1). National Evaluation Policy Framework. Retrieved from https://www.dpme.gov.za/keyfocusareas/evaluationsSite/Evaluations/National%20Policy%20framework%20Nov%202019.pdf

Greene, J. (2012). Values-engaged evaluation. Evaluation for equitable development results, 192-206. 

Nortman, M. Results focused orientation based on the NDP’s Chapter 3: Economy and Employment, Assignment 1 &2.pdf. 

National Development Plan 2030. (n.d.). National Development Plan 2030 Our Future-Make It Work. Retrieved 21 May 2022, from https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf

Rogers, P.J. (2008). Using Programme Theory to Evaluate Complicated and Complex Aspects of Interventions. Evaluation, 14(1), 29-48. https://DOI:10.1177/1356389007084674

South African Government. (n.d.). Government programmes, projects and campaigns. Retrieved 2 June 2022, from https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/projects-and-campaigns

Steyn, D. (2021, November 3). Should the proposed N2 toll road through the Wild Coast be moved?Retrieved 1 June 2022, from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/should-the-proposed-n2-toll-road-through-the-wild-coast-be-moved-20211103Steyn, D. & Damba-Hendrick, N. (2021, August 2). SANRAL’s N2 toll road development on Wild Coast fueling community division. Retrieved 1 June 2022, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-02-sanrals-n2-toll-road-development-on-wild-coast-fueling-community-divides/

Results focused orientation based on the NDP’s Chapter 3: Economy and Employment

Given the context of the National Development Plan (NDP) this assignment will critically review the value of results-based planning of Chapter 3: Economy and Employment. Additional evidence will assess the results orientation in the NDP, with reference to the chapter. Furthermore, the role of evaluation and the realization of outcomes and impact envisaged by the NDP will be reviewed. The constant background of the essay will attempt to recognize what the role of evaluation is in achieving the goals of the NDP. It is, therefore, imperative to understand that monitoring and evaluation in this setting will review the results-based focus ranging from the impact, outcomes, and outputs of Chapter 3. Parkhurst (2017) argues that “evidence matters for public policymaking”. As suggested the NDP’s plan to implement policy intervention within the economy and among employment will shift focus towards the short-term and long-term implementors. 

Chapter 3: Economy and Employment 

According to the NDP 2030, Chapter 3: Economy and Employment, the main objective is centred around the alleviation of poverty and reducing the levels of inequality in South Africa. It was noted that this would be achieved through productivity and growth, while key elements ranged from export, skills development, cost of living, investment in infrastructure, and the improvement of labour markets, among others. The chapter discusses the gross domestic profit’s (GDP’s) direct involvement in economic growth, while highlighting how South Africa is in a “low growth, middle income trap” (NDP 2030, n.d, p. 110). A majority of the emphasis of this chapter is set on the objectives and underlying premises in achieving results and achievements. While this essay will review the paradigm which focuses on he actual effects. 

The NDP highlights that the success driven from it would raise economic growth, while promoting exports which make the economy more labour absorbing. These internal capabilities focused on intermediate results would benefit South Africa’s high unemployment rate, while initiating public value. The NDP 2030 (n.d, p.111) argues that weaknesses in South Africa’s economy can be attributed to its “extreme pressure on natural resources, energy constraints, spatial misalignments, and limited access to large markets because of geographical distance”. However, the NDP 2030 explains that given South Africa’s misfortune, the country included natural endowments as well as a strong fiscal position allows a strong and deep financial services sector, quality universities, and a small but sophisticated services industry” (NDP 2030, n.d, p. 111). 

Asses the value of evidence-based planning in M&E

Hobson, Mayne & Hamilton (2014, p. 5) stated that monitoring and evaluation (M&E) involves the collection and analysis of a programme, while providing a periodic and retrospective assessment of the organisation or programme. Moreover, according to the context provided, results-based focus can be monitored and evaluated from a plethora of terms. The definition of M&E is widely spread across governments decision of policy making and its intervention processes. Puri and Rathinam (2022) explain that a good M&E system needs to be relative to its indicators, as well pre-defined rules and protocols which can measure these indicators. Head (2015) argues that public decision making is dependent on an evidence-informed analogy, of which improved effectiveness from service and delivery hold democratic countries accountable. 

“The evidence-based policy movement sought to promote rigorous analysis of policy and program options, with the intention of providing useful input for policy makers” (Head, 2015, p. 472). However, the evidence-based policy as attributed to Head (2015) can be anchored in the policy process that conceptualises political views, persuasion and negotiation. Policy making can be dynamically viewed through the ideas and preferences of political leaders, legislators, lobbyists, stakeholders, while being mediated through media and public opinion (Head, 2015). Moreover, Head (2015, p. 473) explains that conditions for evidence-informed policy to work are endorsed by “the beliefs that evidence-based approaches are possible but require a significant commitment to rigorous methodologies for program evaluation”. Parkhurst (2017) highlighted that evidence-based results are dependent on good governance of which political leaders are required to embrace the political nature of policymaking head-on. The author suggests that although the approach of good evidence to inform policy constitutes good use of evidence among the policy process, it does “not reject the importance of evidence” (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 8). 

Results-based orientation within Chapter 3 of the NDP

Studies suggest that policy-making is attributed to the direct political perspective that would create public value while excluding political interest. However, Parkhurst (2017) suggests that key issues among the nature of policymaking is retrospective in the sense that political interference is the main premise for new policies. This section will discuss how political interjection and good governance can be seen through the achievements and results of the NDP’s plan to improve employment and stimulate economic growth. “Evidence cannot tell us which is the right choice between different arrangements of benefits or which social outcomes should be pursued over others, such decisions must be made on the basis of some formal consideration of social values, which modern democratic principles would argue need to be done in transparent and accountable ways that serve to represent the public” (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 9). In adddition, the author argues that the approach towards political perspective can be seen through the arrangement between political institutes dictating with processes affect the outcomes of a policy. 

Case Study of M&E withing the Framework – Vision 2030 Jamaica NDP

The following section will detail the M&E framework located within the Vision 2030 Jamaica NDP. According to the official website of the Vision 2030 Jamaica, the countries NDP is underpinned by an approach that incorporates “performance management with evidence-based management” (Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework – Vision 2030 Jamaica–National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision 2030 (2022). 

Monitoring:

The first step of the programme as analysed through monitoring noted that the programme was operationalised through national and sector strategies within its Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF). Moreover, the programmes and action within the MTF and the NDP were remitted through implementors, of which the outcome of monitoring involved the “measurement of changes in the performance of national outcome indicators” (Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework – Vision 2030 Jamaica–National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision 2030 (2022). “The monitoring of development outcomes measure development gains or progress towards targets or the achievement/exceeding of targets,” as noted by (Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework – Vision 2030 Jamaica–National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision 2030 (2022).

Evaluation:

The level of evaluation within the 2030 Vision Jamaica NDP was attributed to sub-programmes and projects intended to assess the effectiveness of the design of the programme, strategies, and implementation. Moreover, (Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework – Vision 2030 Jamaica–National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision 2030, 2022) states that the “scaling up of programs and action sub programs and projects and their replication could be informed through evidence of evaluation, however the evaluation of programs and actions were usually the remit of implementers”. Lastly, the programme detailed how the national outcome of evaluation was subjective to its policies and strategies aligned with its national and local sector objectives. 

Chapter 3: Economy and Employment

If the NDP’s Chapter on Economy and Employment needs to be critically reviewed its vital to understand the different levels of results within M&E: 

1. Inputs

The inputs can be attributed to the premise of time, staff, technology, partners, equipment and materials (Invest). Puri and Rathinam (2022) argue that the protocols of the indicators should be specific to the technology that is used to collect and interpret the data. Therefore, the NDP’s analysis of improving the economy and unemployment would be conducive to its analogy and measurement of the GDP and the unemployment rate. It is important in understanding the dynamic of employment and economy, what the design evaluation can explain about the standards for evaluation across government. The effectiveness and relevance of the inputs can be seen through public value and political inflictions. According to the NDP 2030 (n.d, p. 11) in the short-term, more jobs can be created through service-orientated businesses aimed at market or larger firms and households with income. The inputs of the NDP can be remitted through the time it takes to focus on the programmes benefits to society, the technology needed (export restraints and increases in exported goods), partners (neighbouring countries) which could directly impact South Africa’s economic strength. 

• Outputs

Policy advice, recommended actions, and management plans can be identified among the outputs of the programme. The NDP 2030 highlights that reducing the cost of living for the poor is essential in achieving a social floor and enhancing people’s lives. Policy advice can be used through lobbyist’s and legislature that devise a plan to combat immediate effects which contribute to South Africa’s economy and employment. An example could be unions or non-profit organisations (NGOs) which directly affect the achievement of the programme, the cost of inflation on the most vulnerable groups could be liaised through these NGOs or unions. 

• Outcomes (Immediate Outcomes) 

Kusek and Rist (2004, p. 57) argue that from outcome we derive targets that are generally short-term, while “outcomes are usually not directly measured only reported on”. Therefore, it is important to understand the indicators relative to the objectives at this point, when measured against the intended objectives. “Decisionmakers and stakeholders are positioned to make the intended outcomes of governmental action as explicit as possible” (Kusek and Rist, 2004, p. 58). Kusek and Rist (2004) explain that these indicators would determine the outcomes due to the nature of the outcomes and not the indicators itself. Moreover, we can highlight that outcomes would be demonstrated through the success that the programme has achieved, of which setting outcomes becomes essential in building results-based focus in a M&E system. 

“There is political process involved in setting and agreeing upon desired outcomes, each part is crucial to the success of achieving stakeholder consensus with respect to outcomes” (Kusek an Rist, 2004, p. 59). The overall process of setting outcomes can be particular to the stakeholders engagement and representation. The NDP states that for employment to be created, and economic stagnation to improve, South Africa needs to improve its level of export which will create employment and economic growth. According to StatsSA (March 8, 2022), South Africa’s GDP grew by 1,2% in the fourth quarter (October to December 2021), which increased annual growth for 2021 to 4,9%. The organisation noted that this was largely due to an increase in the demand for goods and services, “while it drove up the expenditure of the economy, with exports and household expenditure the most significant contributors to growth” (Statistics South Africa, 8 March 2022). As Kusek and Rist (2004, p. 59) note outcomes should be “disaggregated sufficiently to capture only one improvement area in each outcome statement”. 

• Impacts

Puri and Rathinam (2022) state: “The difference between a monitoring system and an impact measurement system or relative to the M&E system which can help inform if the intended outputs of the program”. This can be realized whereby an impact evaluation could assist in informing a measure for outcomes and impacts which may have been realized and were caused by the program. Therefore, if a programme becomes implemented only at a partial level, the difficulty will lie in distinguishing whether the programme was poorly designed or badly implemented. It can be noted that not all policy making, or programmes will follow the original objectives, but will be subject to political interference and logical reasoning from third parties. Therefore, the key to observing change in the outcomes of the programme will need to be monitored via its nature and quality of the programme, if the rat of unemployment can decrease a direct result of export goods and services, this impact needs to be measured and attributed to its stakeholders. 

Conclusion

The NDPs 2030 goal of improving economic stagnation and lowering the unemployment rate is relative to the direct inputs central toa results-based orientation. The impact of a M&E system on the NDPs goals can place direct protocols on developing a programme that can be successfully measured while the achievements can be efficiently measured. The paradigm of actual effects on the programme will change beyond the bureaucratic processes by planning and decision making on future events (outcomes). 

References 

Department Planning, Monitoring, And Evaluation. (November, 2019). National Evaluation Policy Framework. Retrieved from https://www.dpme.gov.za/keyfocusareas/evaluationsSite/Evaluations/National%20Policy%20framework%20Nov%202019.pdf

Head, B. W. (2015). Towards More “Evidence-Informed” Policy Making? Public Administration Review, 76(3), 472-484. https://DOI:10.1111/puar.12475

Hobson, K., Mayne, R., & Hamilton, J. (2013). A step by step guide to monitoring and evaluation. Retrieved from https://transitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Monitoring-and-evaluation-guide.pdf

Kusek, J. Z., & Rist, R. C. (2004). 10 Steps to A Results Based Monitoring and Evaluation System. A Handbook for Development Practitioners. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/World%20bank%202004%2010_Steps_to_a_Results_Based_ME_System.pdf

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework – Vision 2030 Jamaica–National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision 2030. (2022). Retrieved 23 May 2022, from http://lslandr.com/vision2030/monitoring-and-evaluation-me-framework-vision-2030-jamaica-national-development-plan-ndp/

National Development Plan 2030. (n.d). National Development Plan 2030 Our Future-Make It Work. Retrieved 21 May 2022, from https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf

Parkhurst, J. (2017). The Politics of Evidence: From Evidence-Based Policy to The Good Governance of Evidence. Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy. Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/68604

Puri, J., and Rathinam, F. (15 October, 2020). Designing An End System for Impact Evaluation: Tips for Program Designers and Evaluators! Independent Evaluation Unit. Retrieved from https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/blog/designing-me-system-impact-evaluation-tips-program-designers-and-evaluators

Statistics South Africa. (8 March, 2022). The South African economy records a positive fourth quarter. Retrieved 23rd May 2022, from https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15214

Power, context, governance and the achievement of public value & institutional frameworks: and their relationship to governance and leadership

This argument will critically review the comment which discusses that South Africa was a victim of the post-colonial project, which define good governance and ignore the context, whilst privileging the industrialised north. It will carefully review whether the rules and constructs which form governance have been misconstrued by the authors of “good governance”. Furthermore, it will note that the practises and ideologies of colonialism were carefully constructed by the very same groups which decide that counties should follow an almost “check box list” pertaining to its level of governance. Highlighting the idea of context, this essay will emphasise the concept of power, governance, and accountability, whilst understanding whether the role of power imbalances play a vital role in the achievement of effective governance and public value. In addition, the concept of power without accountability becomes exempt from the context that South Africa is blamed for poor governance, whilst its pre-accessors did not allow much room for governing. This however, does not excuse South African public institutions from its precarious misdoings. The idea that problematising power, context, governance and the achievement of public value will also be illustrated through the relationship of institutional frameworks. Moreover, global inequality will be addressed by paying attention to the legitimacy of the global North and South. For the reason being, that the South is subjected to the rules in which it should comply to due to the North hiding behind its idea of “good governance”. A central focus throughout the paper will be focused around the poor set of rules that the North expected the South to comply with, post-colonial. 

What is good governance?

Governance can be argued that it stemmed from the etymology of the Latin word “gubernare”, or the Greek word, “kubernaein”, which in English means to “steer”. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published a 100 page paper titled ‘Governance Indicators – A Users’ Guide’, which regards itself as a user’s manual on how countries can “follow boxes which define governance according to the UNDP, the European Commission, and the World Bank” (UNDP, 2004, p. 2). Moreover, the paper has a specific section which explains “governance indicators can be conceptualised at different levels depending on what is being measured” it goes on to say that “there is no universal agreement on the appropriate terms to be used for each level, we attempt to provide the most common terms” (UNDP, 2004, p. 4). Would this concept then be plausible to a global context? Can the rules in which the South needs to comply with adhere to the same rules that the North also need to? According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (n.d, p. 1) the term governance is explained to be “the process of decision-making and the process by which decision are implemented (or not implemented)”. Moreover, good governance is said to have eight key characteristics: “participatory, consensus, orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable, and inclusive” (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, n.d). The global South is continually expected to deliver what needs to be delivered, emphasising that governance is equal to performance. 

Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined governance in 1996 as, “promoting good governance in all its aspects ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency of accountability of the public sector and tackling corruption” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d). However, currently the term has almost become distraught while only applying to certain countries, whilst others that attempt to adhere are judged for their failing performance. Using South Africa as context, poor leaders, weak public institutions, corruption, greed, and power are centralised to the idea that the country has a “tick-box” which defines its level of effective governance. Countries in the global North, such as Europe are deemed to be the bearer of “good governance”, however, the context is ignored. Let this subject not forget that colonies such as the United Kingdom and France rigged the elections in Accra, Ghana during Independence Day in 1957 (Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019). Or that the people of Central Africa cannot spend the money that belongs to them, as France governs it independently. How then are leaders in the South meant to follow suit if western and northern powers are running its own set of rules in Africa? And then hold leaders in the South accountable for a lack of good governance. 

Post-colonial South Africa 

Colonialism as defined by Kenalemang (2013, p.13) refers to “the policy or practise of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically”. Therefore, post-colonialism is a result of colonialism on a countries social, political and economical structures. As literature suggests those that were oppressed by colonial rule had no choice on an individual level to accept or reject the powers of imperialism. According to Lalu (2019) the ideology that the South lives in a post-colonial phase poses more questions to the current structures of governance. Lalu (2019) states that there is a common misconception among South Africans that because the current system of South Africa fought apartheid it can be deemed as ‘post-colonial’. However, the author argues that this claim “is exceeded by the constraints of colonialism, segregation, and apartheid on the questions of subjectivity” (Lalu, 2019). Additionally, the social forces and class consciousness that preceded the country during 1980 can critique the current inequality that is effectively felt in South Africa today. Whilst Hall (1995) argues “if post-colonial time is the time after colonialism, and colonialism is defined in terms of the binary division between the colonisers and the colonised, why is a post-colonial time also a time of difference?”. This explains then what is meant by counties being equal and autonomous, yet the post-colonial matrix is still evident in modern literature. 

“Countries that strive to respond effectively to crises and to build resilience need adaptable, capable institutions” United Nations Development Programme (2011, p. 271). This by definition as highlighted previously pertaining to the principles of governance explains the need for resilience within an organisational capacity to adopt to the changes of current or past crises. Moreover, “while institutions performance is the foundation of state capacity to function and fulfil it obligation towards its citizens, it is not a sufficient condition for countries that need to respond to shocks and deal with a changing environment” (United Nations Development Programme, 2011, p. 271). South Africa adopted its own counter-act towards crises such as apartheid by adopting certain values and educational systems such as “Ubuntu”. Mokgoro (1998) states “Ubuntu(-ism), which is central to age-old African custom and tradition however, abounds with values and ideas which have the potential of shaping not only current indigenous law intuitions, but South African jurisprudence as a whole”. 

The term “jurisprudence” is defined by the latin of “jur” meaning law, and “prudence” being knowledge. As the author suggests this knowledge of the law in South Africa being present or past moulded a set of beliefs and values that South Africans who were once oppressed could find asylum within. The ideas of Ubuntu-ism were not formed by colonial powers, but as formed through resilience against oppression by institutional frameworks within South Africa. 

Colonialism as defined by Chinua Achebe

Nigerian author and writer, Chinua Achebe, was deemed as the “grandfather of African literature” in his 1958 novel, ‘Things Fall Apart’. Chinua Achebe defines colonialism from an African point of view as he details how white missionaries in Umuofia in Nigeria infiltrated the local system whilst forcing their views of political and cultural structures to change. This is one of the most idealistic view points from an African writer on the influence of western powers over African cultural beliefs. Kenalemang (2013) states that before Chinua Achebe’s work, the only accounts of western influence colonialism were published and written by Europeans. “European writing described Africans as uncivilised and uneducated, whilst Europeans saw themselves as more advanced than Africans, being determined to help Africans shift from the old era into the modern era of civilisation and education” (Kenalemang, 2013, p. 4). This ideology unfortunately has left a lasting impression on the minds of Africans, subjectively noting that for Africans to trust a “white face” is more acceptable despite the rules or laws that the South need to adhere to. 

Role of power and the achievement of public value

As the context suggests the definition of good governance should be held against accountability and counter-act power. However, a lack of governance can lead to the abuse of power, as seen predominantly in nations located in the global South. According to a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which ranks countries on a rating scale of 0 to 100, Kenya, Nigeria, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Somalia are ranked as the most corrupt nations (Ojekunle, 2019). This would therefore, explain why corruption is a symptom of impunity resulting in poor governance and abuse of power. Furthermore, applying this definition to public institutions or former political leaders within South Africa the concept of poor governance coupled with power creates impunity. 

According to Everatt (2019) the concept of governance is rich with democratic potential, given countries comply with the definition of ‘good governance’. Everatt (2019, p. 1) argues that “inherent demand for power to be held accountable at every level, governance is potentially threatening to those with power, and to those who may wish to abuse power”. If we apply the context of post-colonialism to this statement, in content formers leaders of South Africa which governed the National Party between 1924 whilst being disbanded in 1997, had their own political secrets. Hyslop (2005, p. 1) states “the administrative and political legacies brought to the present by both the old South African state structures and the new political leadership produce varying types of corruption”. Corruption among newer leaders such as former President, Jacob Zuma, is a clear example of the abuse of power in governing a country. Everatt (2019) claims that Zuma currently has 780 counts of fraud against him, largely pertaining to corruption. This idea of poor governance should then not be able to excuse bad behaviour, this becomes centralised in observing the context of where corruption, power, and greed stem from. Does South Africa then according to the principles and definitions of good governance as stated by the North fail to tick the check box for good governance? In addition, this would then mean that the same rules that the South need to comply with given its context should be applied to the North as well. As not to segregate countries which are deeply rooted in racial, cultural, and religious inequalities whereby poor governance might be imminent. This lends to the idea that power imbalance distort what is understood to be “good governance”. The abuse of power by leaders and the rules in which they need to comply results in a lack of public value. 

Relationship between institutional frameworks and public value

The institutional frameworks and structures balance the relationship with governance, it would by definition therefore, be the balance between freedom and constraints. Critically analysing how autonomous we are within South Africa, and how equal the nation is, could explain the relationship between institutional frameworks, incentives, conduct, and the achievement of public value. This explains the active role for society in development and implementation of public policy to ensure that institutions are adhering. On a local individual level this would create legitimacy holding the state accountable for poor governance or lack thereof. Therefore, institutions are heavily influenced by behaviour whilst they include variables such as culture, legal frameworks, organisations, and the physical environment in which determine governance frameworks. Institutional frameworks and governance frameworks are therefore, one of the same, they both led by behaviour whilst either being engineered or emergent. 

However, how are institutional frameworks held accountable when they fail to deliver public value. According to the World Population Review (2021) countries are measured by a gini coefficient which is a statistical measurement of wealth and income distribution in a country. Its noted that South Africa has the highest gini coefficient reflecting a score of 63.0, replicating the higher the grade to 100%, the greater the percentage of inequality in a country. World Population Review (2021) argues that certain countries might be dependent on the limitations of a reliable gross domestic profit (GDP) and income data, revealing inadequacy in the percentile. Moreover, variables such as “income inequality has political and economic impacts such as slower GDP, reduced income mobility, greater household debt, political polarisation, and higher poverty rates” World Population Review (2021). This suggests the level of poor governance in South Africa, and the need for accountability by organisations, however, it would be hypocritical to the paper as the initial argument surrounded the notion that governance should not be measured. 

Centralisation 

Borrowing from the example of the health care system, it would be imperative for the level of health care that individuals are receiving to be aligned with the health care systems in that hospital. This then questions the idea of centralisation among institutional organisations. As van den Heerver (2011, p. 1) argues “public health systems are not naturally responsive to the need of the population served, whilst service delivery is very operational in nature, it requires an organisational model oriented to providing service”. As the author argues the need for accountability in service delivery is significantly reduced whilst the level of performance is affected. Rubio (2011, p. 3909) states “there is little evidence that countries with a more decentralised health system have better health outcomes”. 

Therefore, the term of decentralisation as defined by the author refers to the measurements in fiscality proportional to the “total expenditure or revenue accounted for by sub-national governments on a populations health” (Rubio, 2011, p. 3909). In context, South Africa’s health care would be shared between responsibilities among the central and local government, whilst local organisations within government are held to accountability for the level of health care for individuals. This would therefore, be dependent on organisational frameworks within governance. Using an example such as the organisational departments such the South African Medical Council and the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority which fall within South Africa’s classification of extra-budgetary accounts and funds (EBAs). As noted by StatsSA (2021), EBAs account for 5% of public healthcare spending as its active role in informing the public about the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. This direct expenditure by government should be benchmarked against the decentralisation of public expenditure towards the need of public value. 

Conclusion 

Public organisations such as the South African Security Agency (SASSA) are a clear indication of the failure to deliver public value whilst being coherently subjected to internal organisational corruption by public officials. Dispatch Live (2021) reported that 12 000 government workers in the Eastern Cape illegally drew R16,1 million in SASSA grants during the course of 2021. Poor governance is therefore, present in the need for accountability in public organisations. Although, it’s easier to blame colonialism and Western infiltration in rules by the North, the abuse of power by government leaders in South Africa is evident. The crises such as apartheid and colonialism have left the South to be governed and ruled by the North, whist being subjected to leaders who need to adopt accountability for corruption and greed. Therefore, govern, governance, and government are interchangeable with a reliance on power and resilience. 

References 

Cheeseman, N., & Fisher, J. (2019, November 2). How colonial rule committed Africa to fragile authoritarianism. Retrieved September 24, 2021 from https://qz.com/africa/1741033/how-colonial-rule-committed-africa-to-fragile-authoritarianism-2/

Dispatch Live. (2021, September 22). 12,000 Eastern Cape state workers skim R16 million in SASSA social grants. Retrieved September 26, 2021 from https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2021-09-22-eastern-cape-state-workers-illegally-access-millions-from-sassa/

Everatt, D. (Forthcoming August 2019). Governance: Notes towards a resurrection. In D. Everatt (Ed).), Governance and the post colony: Lessons from Africa. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press.

Hall, S. (1995). ‘When was the post-colonial? Thinking at the limit’ in Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, eds., The Post-colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons (London, New York: Routledge, 1996). Retrieved from https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203138328-30/0-post-colonial-thinking-limit-stuart-hall

Hyslop, J. (2005). Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid. Journal of Southern African Studies, 31 (4). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25065046

Kenalemang, L. M. (2013). Things Fall Apart: An Analysis of Pre and Post-Colonial Igbo Society. Karlstads Universitet. Retrieved from https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:648320/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Lalu, Premesh. (2008). When was South African history ever postcolonial?. Kronos, 34(1), 267-281. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-01902008000100011&lng=en&tlng=en

Mokgoro, JY. (1998). Ubuntu and the law in South Africa (Abstract). African Journals Online 1(1). https://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/43567

Ojekunle, A. (2019, February 4). These are the 20 most corrupt countries in Africa right now. Retrieved September 24, 2021 from https://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/these-are-the-20-most-corrupt-countries-in-africa-right-now/vd2fc2k

Rubio, D. J. (2011). The impact of decentralization of health services on health outcomes: evidence from Canada. Applied Economics, 43(26), 3907-3917. https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/429/files/49217/download?wrap=1

StatsSA. (2021, August 31). The role of EBAs in public healthcare spending. Retrieved September 26, 2021 from http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14628

United National Development Programme. (2004). Governance Indicators: A Users’ Guide. Retrieved September 24, 2021 from https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Governance%20Indicators_A%20Users%20Guide.pdf

United Nations Development Programme. (2011). Governance principles institutional capacity and quality.Retrieved September 26, 2021 from https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_SustainingMDGProgress_Ch8.pdf

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. (n.d.). What is Good Governance? Retrieved September 24, 2021 from https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (n.d.). What is good governance? Retrieved September 22, 2021 from https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/anti-corruption/module-2/key-issues/what-is-good-governance.html

van den Heerver, A. M. (2011). A review of governance models for public hospitals and the district health systems. Retrieved from https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/429/files/49219/download?wrap=1

World Population Review. (2021). Gini Coefficient by Country 2021. Retrieved September 26, 2021 from https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gini-coefficient-by-country

Can it be argued that South Africa has moved into the direction of increased fragility rather than resilience resulting in an emerging crisis?

This paper will discuss the concept of the social contract in the achievement of governance frameworks, with emphasis on the social contract in achieving resilient societies. Moreover, the ideology that South Arica is moving towards the direction of an increased fragility as a direct result of the social and economic distress of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, rather than resilience will be highlighted in the three key drivers of a social inclusive contract. According to the theory the process of fragility is dependable on coherence between the elite social settlement, institutions delivering equally, and the increase in social cohesion (Ndinga-Kanga, van der Merwe and Hartford, 2020, p.2). Moreover, the social inclusivity between society and institutions will explain the importance of social solidarity in an a society that is being deemed as “fragile”. The significance of social policy will borrow form an historical context, with a critical review of how the lack of political and social transformation between a pre-and-post apartheid government was evident. Additionally, this essay will engage with concepts from the author, Richard Titmuss, in ensuring the universalisation of public goods between different societal classes. 

The role of the social contract in the achievement of governance

According to D’Agostino, Gaus, and Thrasher (1996) the idea of the social contract aims at understanding the fundamental social rules, laws, institutions, and/or principles of that study. Therefore, the standard agreement between individuals in a society, and the specific things that individuals value subsequently form the concept of a social contract. The concept identifies the mandatory needs for mechanisms within the society and between institutions and individuals. “The ultimate goal, then, of social contract theories is to show, in the most general sense, that social (moral, political, legal, etc.) rules can be rationally justified” (D’Agostino, Gaus and Thrasher, 1996). The role of the social contract in the achievement of governance would be directly dependable therefore, on the individuals within that society who allow themselves to be governed by the political mechanisms of that country.

This would in turn allow the government to focus on public value, by delivering public goods this reflects an increasing contestation that creates legitimacy in people. Individuals trust the government and the rules they governed by, and the principle of public value. This creates a relationship between the individual and the state, whereby people feel that the money they paying towards tax is being used in a legitimate manner.

Increased fragility as a consequence of COVID-19 in South Africa

According to the context it was suggested that due to the consequences of COVID-19, South Africa has moved into the direction of increased fragility. As the concept of social contract highlights, the need of coherence between the government and individuals will arguably create social cohesion. However, in 2020 the South African government needed to principally prioritise the social and economic consequences that would be affected by COVID-19. According to the concept of viable fragility, the notion is that governance has addressed the face of grievances within a certain society. However, a study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2020, argued that South Africa’s gross domestic profit (GDP) would need at least five years to recover from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Reliefweb, 2020). It was reported that South Africa’s GDP declined by “at least 5,1 and to 7,9 in 2020”, with a recovery rate which would only be seen in 2024 (Reliefweb, 2020). The list of grievances that were recognised as a result of the pandemic, saw the number of households increase below the poverty line, as the unemployment rate increased to 34,4% (Reuters, 2021), pushing individuals into lower down societal-economic classes. Whist, “thirty-four percent of households are likely to exit the middle class into vulnerability” (Reliefweb, 2020). This evidence suggests that the middle and lower classes have become more suspectable to the effects of vulnerability as a result of poor governance in addressing social policies as a direct result of COVID-19. This creates an issue between the relationship of state and individuals. This level of inequality between individuals has now be intensified by the effects of COVID-19. Moreover, this need of vulnerability by certain groups needs to be expedited by government policies and plans, to decrease the likelihood of the middle class falling into poverty. 

This concept of vulnerability, dependability on the state, and the legitimacy of government  policies highlights South Africa’s level of fragility. According to the 2019 Fragile States Index (FSI), which indicates a countries fragility according to 12 indicators relative to its “cohesion, economic, political and social categories” (Dlamini (2019, p.1). With 12 indicators monitored it was reported that South Africa “scored 71,1 out of a possible 120”, placing it 88^th on the list of fragile states. Dlamini (2019) explains that this level on the index critically reviews South Africa’s overall level over the past 13 years, positioning it into the Warning band. A significant decline was monitored in terms of South Africa’s State Legitimacy, whilst Public Services went up and down (Dlamini , 2019). 

Social policy relative to governance 

South Africa’s inadequacy in social policy was evident in its weak capabilities of delivering public value to the most vulnerable-groups during 2020- 2021. According to the FSI released in 2019, this indices was highlighted pre-COVID-19 noting that Public Services saw an increase and a decline [fluctuated]. However, according to multiple articles in the news during this period, South Africa’s Public Service sector saw multiple scandals in 2021, from corruption over the COVID-19 Relief Fund, failure in the South African Social Security (SASSA) social relief grants (SRD), to corruption and greed in primary public service institutions. Therefore, this can argue whether South Africa legitimised the need of social cohesion and grievances among individuals. 

The role of the social contract in achieving resilient societies

As suggested in the context the need for a social contract is reliant on three key drivers, the elite political settlements, the institutions delivering equally, and the increase in social cohesion. If all three key drivers are adapted cohesively within a state, does then constitute a resilient society? Ndinga-Kanga, van der Merwe and Hartford (2020, p.2) state that these three key drivers “examine the resilience of the social contract, whilst the extent to which these dimensions of the social contract address the drivers of conflict will determine the extent of resilience”. As the authors suggest this forges the concepts of service delivery and economic participation as the drivers of conflict in South Africa. 

During 2020-2021 the social constraints of government corruption crippled the need of funds to be equally distributed to the most vulnerable groups. The country witnessed 150 South African National Post Offices (SAPOs) being closed down to a lack of sustainable funding. In turn the corruption by management and staff at SASSA branches witnessed R70 million being squandered during its 2008/2009 financial year (South African Medical Journal, 2010), whilst 17 officials were accused of abusing the disability grant system in 2021. This lack of social policy is the reason that South Africans will move further down the societal-economic ladder as a result of poor governance. 

Social policy and public value

Titmuss (1974) states that the concept of social policy is denoted by its ability to imply changes towards a changing situation, systems, practises, and behaviour. As suggested this concept notes the meaningfulness of policy on a society, group, or an  organisation. Richard Titmuss’ core values lay in the principles of not individualising certain groups based on their situation. Titmuss explained that if polices and strategies’ were developed around a certain group, e.g. healthcare predominantly for the poor, the system of healthcare in itself will be poor. Therefore, this created the notion of equality among all individuals, the same level of healthcare, education, and service delivery irrespective of your social standing, as poorer groups of people are not stigmatised due to their situation. Titmuss (1974, p.25) explains that if “social stress corrects itself automatically, then there would be no place for an unpredictable concept like social policy”. This stagmisies current social reforms in countries such as South Africa, whereby government hospitals with poor service delivery, shortage of staff and medical supplies is prioritised to poorer individuals. Whilst a better form of healthcare is accessible to those that can afford it, however, this is contradictory to the notion of basic civil rights. If employment was accessible to the majority of job seekers, this would increase this groups chances of accessing better healthcare. The system is flawed internally, due to the high level of employment, social inequality, poverty and education which are all imment to your level in society and financial standing. Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2014, p.448) explain that “public value in a democracy are typically contested, a relative consensus is discernible from constitutions, legislative mandates, policies, opinion polls, and other forms of sources”. 

Titmuss (1965, p.15) argues that for social policy to inevitable work it would need to effectively become a redistributive agent, as “an agent to prevent a social breakdown”. Titmuss (1965, p.15) reiterates that the “fundamental need to grant all citizens irrespective of race, religion or colour, full and equal social rights”, is dependent on society’s challenge in addressing poverty. Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2014, p.447) argue that “citizens are quite capable of engaging in deliberative problem solving”. This suggests that in accessing a social cohesion between individuals and society, individuals should have a sense that they are able to cohesively relay any issues or grievances to their leaders. A cohesive level among all stakeholders will ensure that a level of public value is achieved. In the role of South Africa’s level of an emerging crisis, this level of representation by all individuals is not evident, and therefore, individuals are feeling excluded with no power to exercise their voice. This level of civil society can force South Africa’s level of fragility further down the indices if the issues are not addressed and handled during its initial stages.

Social change in a historical context

If social change needs to be understood in a historical context, the political transformation from an apartheid era to one that is currently dependable on public value is conflicted. During apartheid there were many group of people who felt the ideology and mandates of the system were crippling individuals on all levels of social and economic inequalities. Whereby peace groups were formed, social inclusion of those less vulnerable were formed and intergroups were developed. Ndinga-Kanga, van der Merwe and Hartford (2020, p.3) argue “during the transition of new identity, a broad range of activists shaped the formation of informal discussion for an inclusive South Africa”. Whilst the United Democratic Front (UDF) became the “umbrella that held political parties, union, religious groups and civil society actors together in popular resistance against apartheid” (Ndinga-Kanga, van der Merwe and Hartford (2020, p.4). 

However, pre-apartheid these groups seemingly fell away, and the need for new problems to be heard had no voice. These structures or levels for people to engage are critical to a countries development. If the concept of social change is directed to the new norm of issues and grievances, this could explain why so many protests over lack of service delivery, intergroup conflicts and no political transformation have become evident. Therefore, Ndinga-Kanga, van der Merwe and Hartford (2020, p.16) highlight “the unfortunate loss in this is rewriting of a successful transition into democracy as an inherent failure for its inability to address socioeconomic inequality”. This forms a lack of poor governance on the levels of inclusive and responsive governance. If South Africa’s government listens to the grass roots level allowing a relationship and engagement over all stakeholders, this can also reduce the level of fragility in the state. 

Conclusion

The key drivers of a social coherent contract has been critically analysed as being dependable on the relationship between institutions and the individuals. This social coherence allows for a transformative governance, and relationship between society. However, if issues that are causing social and economic distress are not being addressed by government, this failure of legitimacy would result in further intergroup conflict, protests and poor governance. The consequences of COVID-19 have not increased South Africa’s fragility, however, have just spread the need for transformative institutions. If South Africa can critically review its political settlement, ensuring that are institutions are not elite driven, whilst all stakeholders are equally being represented, this could navigate the current system of governance to a more responsive level. 

References 

Bryson, J.M., Crosby, B.C., & Bloomberg, L. (2014). Public Value Governance: Moving Beyond Traditional Public Administration and The New Public Management. Public Administration Review, 74(4), 445-456. doi:10.1111/puar.12238

Dlamini, K. (2019). Fragile States Index 2019 – SA in the Warning Zone. Corruption Watch. 

D’Agostino, F., Gaus, G., & Thrasher, J. (1996). Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract. In Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/

Ndinga-Kanga, M., H. van der Merwe., & D, Hartford. (2020). Forging Air Resilient Social Contract in South Africa: States and Society Sustaining Peace in The Post-Apartheid Era, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. DOI:10.1080/17502977.2019.1706436

Reliefweb. (2020, August 24). COVID-19 In South Africa: Socio-Economic Impact Assessment.https://reliefweb.int/report/south-africa/covid-19-south-africa-socio-economic-impact-assessment

Reteurs. (2021, August 24). South Africa’s unemployment rate hits new record high in second quarter. https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-economy-unemployment-idUSJ8N2KH000

South African Medical Journal. (2010, August). Mostly warning for welfare staff who stole/squandered R70 million. Retrieved from http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0256-95742010000800007

Titmuss, R. M. (1964). The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy. Social Security, Bulletin. Retrieved from https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v28n6/v28n6p14.pdfTitmuss, R. M. (1974). What is Social Policy? Retrieved from http://rszarf.ips.uw.edu.pl/welfare-state/titmuss.pdf

Thandika Mkandawire’s approach to the application of the concepts of social policy and neo-patrimonialism

According to Adam & Dercon (2009, p.173) the field of economic development is entrenched in the questions of political economy and how the “political choices, institutional structures, and forms of governance influence the economic choices made by government” and society. Additional emphasis made by these authors will be discussed within the two core theories highlighted in Mkandawire’s work. Additionally, this paper will review Mkandawire’s approach to the application of social policy and neo-patrimonialism and its influence on the economic performance in Africa. Moreover, Mkandawire’s descriptions of how the two theories are closely related to Africa’s economic and development context with relevance to the understanding of governance and public value. Additionally, the three areas of social policy will be discussed with emphasis on Mkandawire’s approach, as well as the vertical distribution of state resources detailed in neo-patrimonialism.

Mkandawire’s approach to neo-patrimonialism

According to Mkandawire the idea that Africa has been closely related to the concept of neo-patrimonialism is tied up in the mannerism and economic development of most African states. “The idea that neopatrimonialism is central to unravel the facts behind Africa’s poor economic performance has been advanced as the neopatrimonialism school of thought” (Mkandawire, 2015, p.562). Moreover, Mkandawire explains that although he could apply the principle of neo-patrimonialism to Africa, the lack of economic development cannot be measured and offers little analytical content to the underperformance of African states as compared to developed nations. “Neopatrimonialism is, then a marriage of tradition and modernity with an offspring whose hybridity generates logic that has had devastating effects on African economies” (Mkandawire, 2015, p.565). Additionally, he explains how these concepts of modernity and tradition were the forefront for superstitions, irrational belief, and the primary ideas for select interest, which he highlights formed the basis of African culture and history. 

Mkandawire explains how the lack in political policy and social reforms as measured by policy formulation is entrenched in the simplistic findings of Marxism, which explains how leaders act on behalf of private functions at a low microeconomic level which greatly impacts macroeconomic processes. “When microeconomic level phenomena are extrapolated, what results is a society with no sense of the public good, one that condones corruption and is inhabited by individuals who focus on their own bellies” (Mkandawire, 2015, p.568). This inherently causes great problems on the social and economic environment of an African country, whereby leaders who are inflicted by power and greed inadvertently shift this mindset to affect the citizens of that country. The problem with this as highlighted by Mkandawire is that it is often so calculated that funds and state resources are distributed at a vertical level, which leaves little or nothing to communities and citizens. “Neopatrimonialism provides a moral cultural gloss that somehow renders corruption understandable and its victims complicit” (Mkandawire, 2015, p, 571). As suggested, Mkandawire highlights how the assertion of corruption is often shifted to a new concept of neopatrimonialism found in Africa. Three main ideas discussed with this issue are seen in Africa’s level of corruption permissiveness at a citizen level, the defense to authority, and how external channels are dominated by the big men (Mkandawire, 2015). 

Mkandawire neo-patrimonialism concept and the African context 

Political and economic development as highlighted in Mkandawire view of neopatrimonialism can be found in many “greedy and gluttonous leaders” (Mkandawire, 2015, p.572) found in Africa. Firstly, the concept of neopatrimonialism can be related to the former, Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, whose regime destroyed Zimbabwe, while Zimbabwe post-2000 politics were built on an authoritarian system. This adversely led to the collapse of social policy and social reforms within Zimbabwe. “Under Mugabe’s leadership for 30 years, Zimbabwe slid from self-sufficiency into poverty and astronomical inflation” (Compagnon, 2013, p.200). Moreover, Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was built to establish to totality in authority which shattered the promise of democracy by Mugabe. 

Additionally, the concept of neo-patrimonialism can be found at the grass roots level in South Africa identified within the African National Congress (ANC). As Mkandawire suggests this is seen in his third feature found in neo-patrimonialism in Africa, the assertion and rule of the ‘big men’. The ANC’s transformation which is regulated by the parties’ personal interests lacks public value and governance, which is increasingly seen in greedy political leaders and corruption by state entities such as the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). “Leadership behavior appears to be characterised by neo-patrimonialism predispositions and, while formal distinctions between private and public concerns are widely recognised, officials nevertheless use their public powers for private purposes” (Lodge, 2014, p,2). Lodge (2014) explains how the ANC’s mobilization of public support has always relied on the patron-client relations; the communities support encompassed by promises made by leaders at a cultural level. Lodge (2014) argues that although the ANC’s party was still widely characterised as a mass-based party, their patrimonial characteristics are increasingly becoming more pronounced, with emphasis on the exchange for political support offered to certain groups. 

Mkandawire approach to social policy 

Mkandawire argues that social policy is of the interest to “neopatrimonialism because of their affinity to the political clientelism often associated with social transfer” (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 588). As suggested the school of focus found in neo-patrimonialism’s focus is on the aspect of social policy in its nature in providing social services. However, Mkandawire argues that under the influence of neo-patrimonialism the economic policy would tend to be more redistributive in nature as compared to productivity, with redistributive policies often categorized over a shorter period. Mkandawire (2015) highlights that if expenditure on education and health is redistributive then the view of neo-patrimonial is opposed to growth. The second assertion by Mkandawire (2015) is that neo-patrimonialism can be found in the states capacity to provide social services, while the view of public management developed in the 1980s undermines the development of structures of governance found in agencies and offices driven by social policy. Mkandawire suggests that social policies in Africa are the result of a wide range of factors “including ideas, interests, path dependence, and international norms” (Mkandawire, 2015, p.591). Furthermore, the author argues that the management of these policies categorized in social welfare are often mismanaged while the systems can be entrenched in corruption. Therefore, this idealistic notion can be captured in raision d’etre as noted by Mkandawire. 

Mkandawire approach to social policy in an African context 

Social policy can be categorized by identifiable areas: wellbeing and welfare, reduction in poverty, social justice, social development, and social peace. As research suggest the socio-economic equality and development found in Africa is unfinished, with a certain disposition to communities who live below the poverty line (Review of African Political Economy, 2021). It can often be seen that focus is constantly on the policy formulation of poverty reduction with little significance of the power relations. As suggested by Mkandawire (2015) the problem with social policy is often found in the issues that connect production, reproduction, and protection. Review of African Political Economy (2021) explains how the importance of social policy should be seen through the ongoing project of decolonization, development, and nation-building, while social policy needs to be negotiated by the relevant social forces. This was indicated in Mkandawire’s (2015) explanation of a ‘Africa rising’, with focus on how social policy s vital in the recovery of structural adjustments found in Africa. 

Oarah (2013) argues how the socioeconomic development and environment found in Nigeria can be attributed to the levels of corruption founded in leaders. “Corruption had been characterized as a dangerous social malaise that had eaten deep into the fabric of the nation” (Oarah, 2013, p.111). As a result, the core inflictions found in Nigeria are often seen within institutions of government which are controlled by corruption and endless redistribution of state resources. This highly centralised state coupled with authority, responsibility and resources centered in government. Therefore, this example of Nigeria can be categorized by other African countries giving centrality to Mkandawire’s notion of social policy and neopatrimonialism in governance and public value. 

Governance and public value 

Mkandawire (2015, p. 573) states “Neopatrimonialism undermines governance”, as suggested the roots of neo-patrimonialism are led by the difficulties in capturing the relationship between state and society. This can be highlighted in bad governance found in African states, as the social relations are overwhelmed by the problematic paradoxes found in contemporary Africa. “With respect to new measures of good governance, neopatrimonialism should reduce voice and accountability, weakened government effectiveness and regulatory control, undermine the control of corruption, dilute the rule of law, and compromise political stability” (Mkandawire, 2015, p.574). Therefore, African countries as suggested by Mkandawire should use indicators for good governance, in efforts to measure their performance for economic development. Additionally, former President Jacob Zuma’s, nine-point plan in efforts to boost the economy can be vital to social policy. As suggested the nine-point plan prioritized energy challenges, agriculture, encouraging private sector, among others. The idea that a nine-point plan can increase social policy and attribute to public value is fundamental to the state of development. This can conflict with Mkandawire’s views that social policy cannot be measured in an African context. 

Conclusion 

As suggested by Mkandawire (2015) the ideology and concept of neo-patrimonialism is often digressed in the transformative nature of policymaking, with emphasis of the developmental context of social policy and the transformation of the African continent. Therefore, as suggested by multiple authors the complicated political, economic, and environmental environment of African states needs to be considered with rise to tradition and modernity as well as culture. If this can be reviewed, the notion of African states dealing with their current issues coupled with the past can address the social issues while increasing development. 

References 

Adam, C., & Dercon, S. (2009). The political economy of development: An assessment. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(2), 173-189. http://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grp020

Compagnon, D. (2013). A predictable Tragedy Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe. University of Pennsylvania Press. Retrieved from https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14782.html

Lodge, T. (2014). Neo-patrimonial politics in the ANC. African Affairs, 113(450), 1-23. http://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt069

Mkandawire, T. (2015). Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections. World Politics, 67(3), 563-612. https://doi.org/10.1017/SOO4388711500009X

Oarhe, O. (2013). Tonic or Toxin? The Sate, Neopatrimonialism, and Anticorruption Efforts in Nigeria. The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, 28(1), 111-134. https://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/82819/1/6%201t700483.pdf

Review of African Political Economy. (November 23, 2021). Social Policy in Africa: The root causes of social problems. Retrieved from https://roape.net/2021/11/23/social-policy-in-africa-the-root-causes-of-social-problems/

Conceptualising two theories of development relative to South Africa

According to Ikejiaku (2009) the concept of comparing Africa’s development with that of the Global North, would largely depend on Africa’s history of colonialism and context. This paper will attempt to apply two theories of development to South Africa’s developmental challenges, namely, neoliberalism and uneven development. The idea that countries in the Global North can be modernised as a comparative study to the same developmental levels of countries in the Global South is hypocritical to the same norms that each country should be moulded into. This paper will highlight the Washington Consensus of neoliberalism as founded by John Williamson, while the idea that gross-domestic profit (GDP) does not account for certain factors in South Africa’s context. Lastly, the four factors of an uneven developmental theory, namely society, space, sector, and scale will be reviewed with emphasis on Harold Wolpe’s articulation of modes of production. 

Development Theory within the African context 

Ekeh (1986) argues that the study of development in Africa poses more hazards within developmental studies compared to other disciplines. Ekeh (1986, p.1) continues to state that this problem is largely due to the fact that “development studies particularly those involving regions outside western Europe, are inherently comparative”. While Ikechukwu (2016, p.13) stated that development was something that was “relational and teleological”. Therefore, the concept of development relative to a country is dependent on the targets initially set out, while the quality and level of freedom is determined by the people according to Ikechukwu (2016). Moreover, Ikechukwu (2016) noted that development was subjective to the level of human experience felt by individuals or society in a region. Ikechukwu (2016) noted that development as an ideological standpoint from an African point view, was adapted after Africans took administration after independence. This inherently moulded the conceptual approach of the different concepts of development. 

Neoliberalism

Mudge (2008, p.1) stated that neoliberalism was the “oft-invoked but ill-defined concept in the social sciences”. Moreover, the concept of neoliberalism is snuggled into the collaboration of “intellectual, bureaucratic, and political” divisions (Mudge, 2008, p.1). The author suggests that during the 1990’s the principles of social democracy were entrenched in mainstream parties whose goals was to live in a “political world not of their own making” (Mudge, 2008, p.1). Marangos (2009) introduces the idea of the Washington Consensus founded by John Williamson in 1989. The concept was introduced to form 10 policy instruments whereby the degree of deployment in Washington was reasonable to the idea itself. The 10 commandments were instrumental to “macroeconomic prudence, outward orientation, domestic liberalization, and free market policies consistent with mainstream economic theory” (Marangos, 2009, p.350). 

However, the idea of neoliberalism relative to South Africa’s context is dependent on the economic and social divisions created by apartheid. Schneider (2010) argues that neoliberal economists are reliant on an unregulated market system in South Africa which aims to improve the livelihoods of black South Africans. Moreover, the role of neoliberal economics in South Africa is fundamental to the role in the distribution of land, privatisation, property rights, and redistribution of income and assets. Schneider (2010, p.2) highlights that “by choosing to focus on narrowly defined economic criteria such as GDP growth and allocative efficiency, neoliberal economists marginalize the vast problems created by inequality and poverty and thus overlook the potential benefits of a redistributive strategy”. Therefore, as the author suggests the concept of measuring GDP in countries such as South Africa pose a hinderance, as suggested. Additionally, the main attributes of air quality, water, pollution, and loss of farmland are clear indicators to the inaccuracies of a measurable GDP. This poses challenges to the developmental crisis within South Africa, as the majority of work within agriculture is carried out by unpaid women in farmlands or community work. This inaccuracy in GDP continues to pose a risk to the social values and inaccuracies of a measurable and concise GDP in South Africa developed by the Global North. Therefore, the South African government need to gear up for policy initiatives which address economic problems with good governance. This key in good governance could fix the GDP, or at least improve it, this could also improve on overcoming the legacy of apartheid ascendent on neoliberalism. 

Uneven development 

According to Kitchin & Thrift (2009) uneven development can be termed as the unevenness or inequality within an economy. While Kitchin & Thrift (2009, p.1) further  defines it as the “apparent feminist geography and feminist geography pf groups worldwide”. Therefore, as suggested the processes of uneven development are dependent on the spatial differences and the equalisation of groups within a system. The context suggests that uneven development is grounded by the polarisation in society, relative to the unevenness of society, sector, space and scale. While the theory of Marxism identified by capitalist recognised uneven development as the basis of the ideology at the expense of society. Unevenness in society is relative to gender, race, and class. While research suggests that South Africa is classified as one the most unequal countries in the world, with a measurable gini-coefficient which reveals the true adaption of the poverty line (Business Tech, July 5, 2021). Moreover, the article noted that South Africans had become poorer over the last six years, while the levels of poverty improved between 2005 to 2011, while it worsened from then to now (2022). This clear adaption of uneven development in South Africa poses a risk to the challenges the country faces, despite a plan or goal at the reduction of inequality by 2030 by the National Development Plan. 

Wolpe (1972) suggested that capitalism and cheap labour in South Africa was dependent of the racial ideology of the Nationalist Party. Moreover, Wolpe (1972, p.425) suggests that segregation within apartheid allowed for the cheap migrant labour-power which generated “intense conflict against the system of segregation”. This is evident in migrant workers who came from underdeveloped areas in the Eastern Cape to work the mines in the North West, Marikana. This example of migrant labour is a clear revelation that the labour force and ideas which came from apartheid never changed. 

Conclusion

The concepts of neoliberalism and uneven development can be applied to South Africa’s developmental challenges as highlighted above. The idea that GDP can be improved based on the appropriate measures of growth within society as well as free-trade can be seen as crisis to South Africa’s development. While the concept of uneven development is emphasised through the unevenness of society distinctly through migrant workers within Marikana. Moreover, the contradictions within South Africa are found between the different ideas of a capitalist movements and the dominant contradiction within the capitalist economy as identified by Harold Wolpe. The approach of uneven development is best suited to South Africa’s climate relative to its poverty line, financialisaton sector between the rich and poor, as well as space and scale. 

References

Business Tech. (2021, July 5). South Africans Have Become Poorer Over the Last Six Years: Government. Retrieved January 22, 2022 from https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/503297/south-africans-have-become-poorer-over-the-last-6-years-government/

Ekeh, P. P. (1986). Development theory and the African predicament. Africa development/ Afrique et Développement, 11(4), 1-40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24486618

Ikechukwu, O. B. (2016). African Theories of Development and The Reality of Underdevelopment. International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability, 4(4), 12-19. https://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/African-Theories-of-Development-and-the-Reality-of-Underdevelopment.pdf

Ikejiaku, B. V. (2009). The Concept ‘Development’ Revisited Towards Understanding: In the Context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Politics and Law, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v2n1p31

Kitchin, R. & Thrift, N. (2009). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/uneven-development

Marangos, J. (2009). The Evolution of The Term ‘Washington Consensus’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(2), 350-384. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00565.x  

Mudge, S. L. (2008). What is neo-liberalism? Socio-Economic Review, 6(4), 703-731. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwn016

Schneider, G. (2010). Neoliberalism And Economic Justice in South Africa: Revisiting the Debate in Economic Apartheid. Review of Social Economy, 61 (1), 23-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/0034676032000050257

Wolpe, H. (1972) Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid. Economy and Society, 1(4), 425-456, DOI: 10.1080/03085147200000023

A policy appraisal process of the Basic Income Grant through civil society and the Department of Social Development

Introduction

This document will discuss the introduction of the basic income grant (BIG) which was implemented through civil society groups as well as the Department of Social Development (DSD). Moreover, the context suggests that various quatres to this proposal were opposed with conflicting analyses offered by various constituency interests. It can be understood that key agenda policy settings are formulated by intertwined stakeholders through careful consideration and planning. Cloete and Meyer (2011, p.5) state that “policy agenda setting refers to deliberate planning process through which policy issues are identified, problems defined and prioritised, support mobilized, and decision makers lobbied to take appropriate action”. Furthermore, this analysis will highlight the two main reasons in policy agenda setting which formulates public policy making. Subsequently the role of non-governmental actors influences the agenda setting process, additionally, through various forms of community development. According to Statistics South Africa (2021), South Africa’s unemployment renders an outcome of approximately 7,2 million people unemployed. The introduction of the BIG is paramount in a country whereby individuals live so close to the poverty line. The basis of this essay will deep dive into which stakeholders attempt to influence policy, whilst using two key materials to add analysis, namely the ‘Financing Options for a Universal Basic Income Guarantee in South Africa’ and ‘Is basic income grant sustainable’. Lastly, it will introduce a process which will result in the successful adoption of the policy. 

Unpacking the Basic Income Grant (BIG)

According to an independent research report conducted by Intellidex (2021) Business Unity South Africa and Business Leadership South Africa together commissioned this report to debate on the BIG through focus on “fiscal and revenue/funding implications”. As suggested the need for the BIG is solely dependent on poverty alleviation, sustainability, and upliftment. Furthermore, the study highlights that during the Finance Minister, Enoch Godongwana’s, initial policy debate surrounding the BIG, he was enthusiastic at the outcomes. However, according to the African National Congress (ANC) 2022/23 medium-term budget policy statement (MTBPS) fiscal funding towards the policy intensified, whilst Godongwana’s was noted to have “opposed the policy” based on financial grounds.

Unpacking the BIG, it is noted to provide real-time aid to those unemployed, suffering from poverty, and giving a solution to a fixed problem in South Africa. The BIG disburses money to a large group of the population in-sync with the poverty line, whilst Intellidex (2021) notes that this sum comprises of approximately 25% of adults. Using another policy formulation by the Department of Employment and Labour, the COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) Grant, the introduction of the R350 to households who had little to no income, alleviated a small problem at the time in April 2021 to date. However, the constraints on grants aimed at alleviating poverty in South Africa needs to narrow down on the debate of fiscality in National Treasury’s budget and maybe follow the route of The Solidarity Fund. Whereby a multitude of stakeholders can contribute directly to a policy that will not only close the gap in the poverty line, but decreasing South Africa’s gini-co-efficient, moreover, contributing successfully to South Africa gross domestic profit (GDP), instead of taxing certain socio-economic groups. 

A Social Security Policy Brief drafted in July 2021, by the Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) discussed the structural context of unemployment, deep poverty, and inequality that a Universal BIG (UBIG) could lay ahead. The IEJ (2021, July) state that most households in South Africa are currently without any form of state income, apart from grants. “The Child Support Grant (CSG), which is already implemented in South Africa, falls below the Food Poverty Line (FPL)”, as stated by the IEJ (2021, p.2). Furthermore, the IEJ weighed the financial constraints of the UBIG, emphasizing that the likelihood that individuals will be allocated funds collectively are proposed through a scenario of 80% to 60%. A clear point highlighted by the IEJ is the introduction of tax increases to fund the UBIG as part of revenue generation. However, the IEJ (2021) argues that an introduction of this will always be met with resistance due to the high tax rates that South Africans are subjected to. Business Tech (March, 2021) emphasizes that South Africa’s tax dilemmas are carried by the wealthy who significantly pay the majority of the country’s income taxes. 

Moreover, the article indicated that this adds pressure to national government “to increase revenue amid rising debt levels and growing expenditure”. Additionally, Business Tech (March, 2021) discussed that firms such as Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) warned that South Africa “relied too heavily on income and direct taxes most of which are coming from a declining base of taxpayers”. Additionally, it is noted that approximately 25% of people who pay income tax pay 80% of all personal income tax, while the South African Revenue Services (SARS) indicated that for the current year [2021] it expected “1,58 million people who are shouldering the bulk of all income tax paid” (Business Tech, March, 2021). 

Policy Appraisal Process

Hertin and Jacob (2008, p.1) highlight that “the ex-ante appraisal of policies has been a standard procedure in government for a long time”. The authors emphasize that the approach has been used in many countries for various reasons, including the “quality of regulation, to reduce implementation costs and to achieve cross cutting objectives – sustainable development, economic competitiveness or human health”. As suggested the need for policy appraisal will be dependent on the financial and social inclination towards the policy by government. Therefore, “policy analysis can be used to inform agenda-setting exercise or to formally analyse a policy that is firmly on the agenda” (Hertin and Jacob, 2008, p,2). Howlett, Tan, Migone, Wellstead and Evans (2014) reiterate that the policy formulation process is directly involved in the appraisal process. Intellidex (2021) states that the UBIG could work by the introduction of taxing certain higher-income earners in South Africans which “would lead to a very significant risk of capital flight” or taxing lower income earners with an “insignificant amount” however, how does the policy predetermine which social-economic group will bear the grunt of the revenue generation. Howlett et al. (2014) points out that policy workers play an important role in the policy outcomes as well as the policy outputs. This poses the question as to which group of people would accurately analyse a policy. 

Moreover, Howlett et al. (2014) state that the “same policy analysis capacity or capabilities” cannot be expected in different policies regarding tools or techniques of analysis. Additionally, the authors highlight that the external components of overall policy advisory systems are dependent on governmental accuracies. 

“The supply and demand conditions overall and within each organisation, not only should the distribution of tools and techniques, tasks and capacities be expected to vary across governmental and non-governmental actors” as noted by Howlett et al. (2014, p.275). The context, therefore, suggests devising a process which results in the successful adoption of the policy, the process can follow a similar route carried out by Howlett at al. (2014). As noted by Howlett et al. (2014) the authors created the introduction of key words into the public largely centered around “policy analysts” which can subsequently distribute the capacities within government through various tools and techniques. These techniques would be fundamental to the policy process, whilst critical skill such as risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis, scenario analysis, and focus groups, among others could be implemented. These techniques “support the idea that specific differences exist across intra-governmental policy venues regarding the types of analytical techniques and appraisal tools that are used by different agencies depending on their task environment” (Howlett et al. 2014, p.280).

Following similar routes to introduction of a policy 

During the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa the financial and economic turmoil’s were felt throughout the country, unfortunately those that lived closest to the poverty line or lower income households were most affected. However, government introduced SRD Grants to alleviate financial burdens which could not be undone. Moreover, the R350 grant can be argued whether such an amount can sustain a person for a period of a month by various lobby groups and civil societies. The introduction of the BIG can induce distributional and incentives effects which can be accurately managed and monitored by the policy responses. A White Paper for Social Welfare drafted in August 1997 encouraged South Africans to participate in the development of an “equitable, people centered, democratic and social welfare system” (Department of Welfare, White Paper for Social Welfare, 1997, p.2). 

Additionally, the preamble highlighted that “South Africans would be afforded the opportunity to play an active role in promoting their own well-being and in contributing to the growth and development of our nation – while the challenges facing the welfare system was to devise appropriate and integrated strategies to address the alienation  and the economic and social marginalization of vast sectors of the population who are living in poverty, vulnerable, and have special needs” (Department of Welfare, White Paper for Social Welfare, 1997, p.2). The importance of social grants or social welfare policies and programmes ensure that vulnerable groups can adequately deal with the economic and social constraints in a country. White Paper for Social Welfare (1997, p.5) notes that these policies and programmes “combined with capacity building can release people from the poverty trap”.

Policy implications

The White Paper for Social Relief (1997, p,6) highlights key issues with the introduction to a social welfare policy, namely a) the lack of national consensus, b) disparities between passed policies and current ones, c) incomplete and inability to understand the need and impact of the welfare spending, d) fragmentation of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of social welfare legislation, as well as e) sustainable financing, and f) an enabling environment. 

The accuracy and importance of policy implications lies in the foundation of corruption. A system of monitoring and evaluation of funding as well as a regulatory body need to be vital key players in the BIG. It cannot be a case of social welfare grants being stolen by government employees much like the R350 SRD which was embezzled by hundreds of government officials who worked for the South African Social Services (SASSA) offices. 

Approaches to policy analysis 

As suggested the technical aspects of a public policy process depends on certain factors which affect the appraisal process. The BIG should directly add to public value whilst highlighting the importance of the policy itself. To understand the basis of the policy the determined options need to be counter-weighed between the benefits/costs in relation to the variable of time. The economic evaluation of a policy as highlighted measures the “cost versus benefits” which should always include the outcomes. Howlett et al. (2014, p.272) explain that the policy analysis can be understood as a “method for structuring information and providing opportunities for the development of alternative choices for the policymakers”. Therefore, as part of policy formulation the accuracy of policy appraisal will follow as suggested by Howlett et al. (2014). 

Stakeholders and policy appraisal 

Howlett et al. (2014) highlights that evidence has proved throughout the years that policy work and analytical techniques are utilized by an array of stakeholders and actors within the different avenues of policy appraisal. In devising a process, the DSD need to actively meet with government in phasing out the BIG whilst continuously consulting with external stakeholders. Intellidex (2021, p,7) states that the “DSD is targeting a phased entry with the SRD as its starting point, but the first steps of a BIG from April 2022”. The role of society in the public policy cycle is vital in achieving the initial objectives of the policy. The context suggests that the BIG was formed by civil societies, so understanding what groups civil societies can be filtered by depends on its authority and geographical mapping. Civil society groups can mobilize interests towards a certain policy, or in the case of the BIG, it mobilizes influence outside the formal structures of the state. 

Civil societies influence the policy process, particularly in the agenda setting aspect. Moreover, civil society organisations are the catalyst to a certain social challenge or problem, while the group lobbies towards a more justice stage. In terms of the BIG the process appraisal process suggests that civil society organisations need to be equipped and skilled with the evaluation process, as well as an implementing partner. Whether the civil society organisation is intertwined with government can be crucial in the implementation process. “Civil societies can sometimes be seen as antagonists, as obstructing government decisions, and thus often exclude or ceremoniously (rather than substantively included) in the policy making process” (Van den Heerver, 2021, slide 6). As the content suggests civil society groups can be deemed as “society’s watchdog against the state” (Van den Heerver, 2021, slide 4). In the policy appraisal process this can be crucial as the BIG need to have a strong motivating backbone in implementing objectives from the initial stage. As Howlett et al. (2014) argues stakeholders are essential for policy appraisal while being largely dependent on the initial goals of a policy during implementation. Most policy review processes were formulated during 1995 to 1996, deemed the White Paper Era, this period was vial for emphasis on service delivery. However, social welfare and SRD Grants need to distinctively adapt with the current social and economic structures of South Africa. Bynard (2005, p.660) highlights “governments may have the most logical policy imaginable, the policy may pass cost/benefit analyses with honors, and it may have a bureaucratic structure, but if those responsible for carrying it out are unwilling or unable to do so, little will happen”. Therefore, adapting the policy appraisal process the idea and notion of a top-down approach would be considered in a variable effective implementation cycle, provided the technical abilities of both civil society organisations and government can form a consensus surrounding the BIG. Bynard (2005, p.661) reiterated the importance of “government joining coalitions with interest groups, opinion leaders, and other outside actors who actively support a particular implementation process”. Therefore, the policy appraisal process determines political goals of policies.

Conclusion 

The DSD can actively implement a social welfare policy centred around funding towards the alleviation of poverty in individuals oppressed by the poverty line. South Africa needs to lessen the amount of individuals who live on the food poverty line by forming coalitions with civil societies and active stakeholders in regulatory boards with government. Bynard (2014, p.662) emphasises that policy formulation and implementation are not the consecutive processes, but are in “many cases parallel process where policy design can take place”. Whilst it can be noted that the government is an uneven distributor of capacities which is essential to the technical capabilities and utilization practises. The policy appraisal will be dependent on governments capacity to implement policy analysts and executively train them, organisational capabilities need to also be monitored as to ensure that the job expectations and work description positively impact the policy. 

References 

Bynard, P. (2005). Policy implementation: Lessons for service delivery. Journal of Public Administration, 40(4.1), 649-664. 

Business Tech. (2021, January 4). This is who pays taxes in South Africa. Retrieved November 21, 2021, from https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/458708/this-is-who-pays-taxes-in-south-africa/

Business Tech. (2021, March 3). 1,6 million people are paying most of South Africa’s income tax. Retrieved November 21, 2021, from https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/472698/1-6-million-people-are-paying-most-of-south-africas-income-tax/

Cloete, F., & Meyer, I. H. (2011). Policy agenda setting. In F. C. C. d. Coning (Ed.), Improving public policy : theory, practice and results (pp. 105-124). Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 

Department of Welfare. (1997, August). White Paper for Social Welfare. Retrieved from https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/whitepaperonsocialwelfare0.pdf

Hertin, J., & Jacob, K. (2008). Policy Appraisal. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251122649_Policy_Appraisal

Howlett, M., Tan, S. L., Migone, A., Wellstead, A., & Evans, B. (2014). The distribution of analytical techniques in policy advisory systems: Policy formulation and the tools of policy appraisal. Public Policy and Administration, 29(4), 271-291. doi:10.1177/0952076714524810

Institute for Economic Justice. (2021, July). Financing Options for A Universal Basic Income Guarantee in South Africa [Social Security Policy Brief]. Retrieved from https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/432/files/59954?wrap=1

Intellidex. (2021, September). Is a basic income grant sustainable? Retrieved from https://witsstudyonline.instructure.com/courses/432/files/59955?wrap=1

Van den Heerver, A. (2021). The role of society in the policy process [PowerPoint presentation]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=535&v=yrtxriqzhN8&feature=emb_logo